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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
N.J.

~IE_A_GHER,

Plaintiff and Respondent
-YS.-

UINTAH GAS COMPANY and
\:ALLEY FlTEL SUPPLY COMpANY,
Defendants,

Civil No. 7723

RA1~ PHEBUS, ASHLEY \TALLEY
OIL CO~IP ANY, PAUL STOCK
AND JOE T. JUHAN,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS RAY PHEBUS,
PAUL STOCK and JOE T. JUHAN

This action, by reason of amendments made subsequent to the first appeal and the decision of this court
herein, now involves the legal effect of a document designated "Release", Exhibit A-30, executed by appellant
Stock in favor of respondent Meagher under date of
October 21, 1944. These appellants contend that the
document is a nullity and had no legal effect.

The

respondent contends that the document is effective to
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transfer from appellant Stock to respondent Meagher
an undivided one-half interest in the oil mineral leasehold
estate in 440 acres of land. An issue with regard to what
is referred to in the record as the North Forty and likewise resolved in ·respondent's favor by the trial court
will be presented separately by appellant Ashley Valley
Oil Company in a separate brief and argument. The
North Forty is a part of the leasehold which comprises
in all 480 acres, of which ~the 440 acres first above mentioned is a part.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This action, a suit to quiet title to real property in
Uintah County, Utah, commenced by the filing of a complaint on October 17, 1944, was before this court in

Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. et al. (1947), 112 U~tah 149,
185 P. 2d 747, and incidentally in Phebus et al. v. Dunford, Judge, et al. (1948), 198 P. 2d 973.
The first decision was on appeal from a decree quieting ~itle in favor of respondent Meagher, the trial court
having held that the oil and gas lease of June 4, 1924,
Exhibit A-1, as modified on May 21, 1927, Exhibit A-3,
had terminated as 'to oil rights by the express provisions
of the lease and had been abandoned as to gas rights.
The trial court decreed on April 15, 1946 (R. 53) that
the oil and gas lease of June 4, 1924 and modification
agreement of May 21, 1927 were invalid and of no force
or effect and cancelled, the defendants in the action, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eaeh of them, being thereby perpetually enjoined fron1
asserting any claim to the pre1nises or any part thereof.
This court reversed the decision of the lower court and
remanded the case for proceedings to conform to the
opinion, holding, among other things, that the lessee had
not given up the lease either by acts consistent with its
forfeiture terms nor by acts that would justify a conclusion of abandonment. Following the decision on the first
appeal of this case a petition for re-hearing was filed and
under date of March 15, 1948 denied. The remittitur was
issued March 16, 1948 (R. 65).
The case of Phebus et al. v. Dunford, Judge, et al.,
supra, was a mandamus proceeding arising out of the
action taken by the trial court ostensibly pursuant to the
decision of this court in the first appeal, the trial court
having vacated and set aside its former decision except
as to Ray Phebus, the petitioner in the mandamus proceeding. In the mandamus proceeding this court held that
its decision (Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. et al., supra),
when filed in the lower court, automatically set aside
in its entirety the lower court's decision and for the sake
of clearing the record the lower court should enter an
order setting aside without limitation its entire decision.
Such an order was entered February 8, 1949 (R. 66).
Oil was discovered in commercial quantities on September 18, 1948 (R. 255) on the property covererd by
the original lease and modification agreement. S.uch discovery was the result of drilling by Equity Oil Company,
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as operator, under an operating agreement with Weber
Oil Company, Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan, who claimed
the working interests in the leas,ehold, Exhibit A-25.
Weber Oil Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Equity Oil Company (R. 259). From September 18, 1948,
date of discovery of oil (R. 255), and up to and including
May 31, 1950 gross crude oil sales amounted to more than
$672,000.00, from which amount something slightly over
$105,600.00 had been withheld on account of royalties
and approximately $574,000.00 on account of operations
and expenditures; indicating substantial values apparent
on the date of discovery, September 18, 1948.
Meagher's original complaint filed October 17, 1944
(R. 1), his amended complaint of February 19, 1945 (R.
14) and the second amended complaint filed April 18,
1945 (R. 17) were all on the theory that Meagher was the
fee owner of the 480 acres involved in the controversy
unencumbered by any leasehold. On October 10, 1945
Meagher filed his verified reply (R. 41) alleging, in effect, that the lease of June 4, 1924 and the modification
agreement of May 21, 1927 were void and of no force
or effect due to the lessee's failure to fulfill the obligations thereof; that there had been no actual drilling for
gas or oil for over fifteen years; that the lease and
modification agreement had expired by the terms thereof;
that the purposes and objects of the same had not been
accomplished; and that the leasehold estate had been
abandoned. The reply was directed to answers theretofore filed by Ray Phebus, Ashley Valley Oil Company
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5
and Joe T. Juhan, 'Yhich ans,Yers "\Vere practically identical in asserting that the lease of June --!, 1924 and the
modification agreement of ~Iay 21, 1927 were in full force
and effect and entitled the defendants to have the same
confirmed and adjudicated as being in full force and
effect as against Meagher and all persons claiming by,
through or under him (R. 20-40). Ray Phebus was p·ermitted to adopt the answer of Joe T. Juhan at the first
trial in January, 1946 (R. 43). Such were the pleadings
at the time of the first trial, at the time of the decree
entered April 15, 1946 and at the time of the remittitur
from this court in connection with the first appeal on
~Iareh 16, 1948 and, in fact, until August 3, 1949 when
the court ordered the filing of an amended reply to the
answers of Juhan, Phebus and Ashley Valley Oil Company (R. 85). By the amended reply Meagher claimed
an undivided one-half interest in the oil mineral leasehold estate, which claim was later identified as being by
virtue of Exhibit A-30.
Prior to the date last mentioned Meagher served upon Juhan, Phebus and Ashley Valley Oil Company a
notice of motion for order authorizing filing of a third
amended complaint, attaching to the notice the proposed
pleading (R. 67). On June 9, 1949 Meagher withdrew
his motion to file the third amended complaint (R. 80)
and on the same day served a motion for order authorizing filing of an amended reply to defendants' answers
(R. 81). Objections were made to plaintiff's motion to
re-open and to file the amended reply (R. 83) and on
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August 3, 1949, by order dated on said day, the trial court
overruled and denied the objections and permitted the
filing of the amended reply. The order contained, among
other things, the following:
"It now appearing that further pleading on the
part of the parties may be desired and that the
regular setting of the trial calendar for the Fall
term in Uintah County is to be held during ·the
court session of the court at Vernal, Uintah
C·ounty, Utah on the 19th day of August, beginning at 10 o'clock a.m., and it appearing that there
is no need for making a special setting in view of
such facts, the motion for special setting is denied." (Italics ours).
The name Paul Stock was carried in the caption
of the order of August 3, 1949 for the first time since
after the filing of the amended complaint on February
19, 1945 (R. 85). Stock was a party defendant as the
case was originally filed and wa.s never dismissed out
of the action. The order for publication of summons was
filed October 17, 1944 (R. 11). The affidavit of attorney
for plaintiff filed the same day (R. 10) states that to
the knowledge of affiant the defendants Ray Phebus,
Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan reside outside, of the State
of Utah. In the order for p·ublication of summons it is
recited that the defendants are unlmown or either dead
or reside outside of the State of Utah and cannot after
'
due diligence, be found therein, and directs summons to
be served by publication. Publication of the summons
carrying the name of Paul Stock as one of the parties'
1
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defendant, was duly made, with the proof thereof filed
February 7, 1945 (R. 13), the same stating, in due form,
that the first publication was on the -1-th day of January,
1945 and the last publication on the first da.y of February, 1945, in the \rernal Express, a newspap·er of general
circulation published once each week at \Ternal, Utah.
After ·the filing of the order of August 3, 1949 carrying the name of Paul Stock as one of the defendants and
the suggestion of further pleading "on the part of the
parties," Stock, on the 17th day of August, 1949, filed his
answer to plaintiff's second amended complaint, and in
connection therewith a counterclaim praying that a purported release executed by him on the 21st day of October,
1944, in favor of Meagher, be cancelled and decreed of
record to be null and void and that it be decreed that
the plaintiff and those claiming or to claim by, through
or under him have no right, title or interest in or to the
leasehold estate by reason of the purported release, or
otherwise (R. 92).
Juhan and Phebus demurred to Meagher's amended
reply (R. 91) and Meagher, in turn, on the 15th day of
October, 1949, served a reply to the Stock answer and
counterclaim (R. 107) which latter pleading was therea£ter amended (R. 115). Stock demurred (R. 117) to the
reply as amended and moved to strike portions thereof
(R. 119). On November 25, 1949 Meagher served a second
amended reply to the answer of the defendants Joe T.
Juhan and Ray Phebus (R. 121) to which Juhan and
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Phebus separately demurred (R. 125, 129) and separately
moved to strike portions thereof (R. 127, 131). The demurrer of Stock to plaintiff's reply as amended, his motion to strike and the separate demurrers and motions
to strike filed by Juhan and Phebus were overruled and
denied bythe court on March 28,1950 (R. 134).
The second trial of the action was tried to the court
without a jury at Provo, Utah County, rather than art
Vernal, Uintah County, on the 26th day of June, 1950
(R. 135), at which time the court permitted the plaintiff
to further amend his second amended complaint, introducing into the case for the first time an issue concerning
a 2% landowners royalty. The court received in evidence
the "A" series of exhibits, marked A-1 to A-62, both inclusive, with the exception of Exhibits A-43, A-44 and
A-45, which were not presented to the court. The cause
was presented largely upon the "A" series of exhibits
offered and received in evidence, stipulations of counsel
and the testimony of Paul Stock and Katherine M. Ivers.
On March 6, 1951 the trial court filed a 55-page
memorandum decision (R. 140). Proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law were submitted on behalf
of Meagher and thereafter and on the 4th day of June,
1951 adopted by the court (R. 200), notwithstanding objections to the proposed findings dated April 14, 1951
(R. 196) and overruled and denied by a supplemental
me1norandum dated June 4, 1951 (R. 197). The objections urged to the proposed findings were that they were
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contrary to the evidence, facts and the law, and further
that they \Yere contrary to the 55-page memorandum decision. The inconsistency between the memorandum decision and the proposed findings was conceded by plaintiff's counsel (R. 327). The decree from which this appeal
is taken is dated June -±, 1951 and was filed in the office
of the Clerk of the District Court, Uintah County, Utah,
June 8, 1951 and entered on said day (R. 220).
The "A" series of exhibits supplants the exhibits
at the first trial and includes photostats and other stipulated evidence relative to title, whether it be to surface
rights, leasehold interests or the fee, in and to the 480
acres of land in the Ashley Valley Oil Field, Uintah
County, Utah, the subject of the litigation. The chain
of the various titles is charted, for the convenience of
the court, on Exhibit A-62, likewise on Exhibit A-57,
both charts indicating the exhibit letter and number applicable to the specific title document. A copy of the
chart, Exhibit A-62, is attached at the end of ~this brief
to more readily illustrate the chain of title.
Exhibit A-30 is a photostatic copy of the recorded
document entitled "Release" dated October 21, 1944, executed by appellant Stock in favor of N. J. Meagher, and
is one of the pivotal questions involved in this appeal.
It is contended by the appellants Phebus, Stock and
Juhan that the so-called release is ineffective as a conveyance, that to assert the same as such, under conditions
to be hereinafter more particularly pointed out, conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stitutes fraud, that Meagher is decisively estopped and
debarred from claiming the same as a transfe·r and that
it is an abortive document so far as any relinquishment
or surrender is concerned.
Ashley Valley Oil Company is not concerned in the
so-called Stock release but is concerned in maintaining
its position as the holder and owner of the leasehold or
working or operating interest in what is called the North
Forty, or 1the NE~ of the SE1)t, of Section 15 of the lands
involved. On the other hand Phebus, Stock and Juhan,
or their assigns, can claim no direct interest in the operating right or working interest in the North F·orty by
way of transfer or assignment. Weber Oil Company,
Stock and Juhan claim to be the owners of the entire
working interest by virtue of the lease and modification
agreement, in all but the North Forty, with Equity Oil
Company the operator thereof, all pursuant to Exhibit
A-25 .

.AJt the time of the execution of the Stock purported
release on October 21, 1944, four days after the commencement of this _action, Phebus had, of record, an undivided one-half of the oil mineral estate in 440 acres of
the original lease, Stock the other one-half of the oil
mineral estate and Juhan the entire gas mineral estate.
The title exhibits in the "A" series supporting the statement just made and in the order of the respective dates
thereof are : 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 15, 12, 13, 14 and 17.
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rrhe title situation of the oil and gas lllineral estates
up to October ~1, 19±4, the date of the alleged release,
with reference to the chart, Exhibit A-62, was: R. C. Hill,
the lessee in the lease dated Jlme 4, 1924, Exhibit A-1,
sublet the sarne on October 30, 1924 to Utah Oil Refining
Company, with the exception of the North Forty, Exhibit A-2, reserving in addition to theN orth Forty certain
interests which he assigned to Ashley Valley Oil Company under date of November 10, 1924, Exhibit A-3. On
May 21, 1927 Ashley Valley Oil Company entered into the
modification agreement with M. P. Smith, Exhibit A-5,
in contemplation of the modification agreement of June

9, 1927, Exhibit A-6, between it and Utah Oil Refining
Company. On April 24, 1929 Utah Oil Refining Company,
Exhibit A-11, by agreement, sublet the property to Ray
Phebus and Paul Stock. On May 29th of that year, Exhibit A-15, Ray Phebus and Paul Stock assigned the gas
rights to Valley Fuel Supply Company. On April 30,
1931, Exhibit A-12, Phebus and Stock assigned the oil
rights to Standard Oil Company of California, which,
in turn, and under date of December 31, 1931, assigned
the same to The California Company, Exhibit A-13, which
latter company assigned back to Stock and Phebus on
March 21, 1934, Exhibit A-14. In the meantime, on October 30, 1930, Edward Watson, Trustee, successor to R. C.
Hill, assigned the North Forty to Ashley Valley Oil
Company, Exhibit A-16. On November 7, 1941 Valley
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Fuel Supply Company assigned the gas rights to Juhan,
Exhibit A-17. Thus the title to the mineral estate stood
at the time of the Stock release dated October 21, 1944,
Exhibit A-30.
Subsequent assignments of the original leasehold,
with the exception of the North Forty, after October 21,
1944 are evidenced, in order of their date, by the "A"
series of exhibits numbered 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 23 and 25.
Restating the various exhibits, Ray Phebus, by quitclaim
and assignment, transferred whatever interest he had
to Juhan. This was on January 19, 1945, Exhibit A-18.
On April 14, 1945 Paul Stock, by a similar document,
transferred whatever rights he had to Charles S. Hill,
Exhibit A-19. Hill in turn, by a similar document dated
January 5, 1946, transferred his interest to Juhan, Exhibit A-20. At the time of the first trial, January 8, 1946,
when Phebus adopted the answer of Juhan, and excluding the North Forty and giving no effect whatsoever
to the so-called Stock release of October 21, 1944, Juhan
was the holder and owner of the entire oil and gas mineral
estates.
At the time of the en try of the decree on April 15,
1946 (later reversed) the title picture, so far as the leasehold pertaining to the oil and gas mineral estates was
concerned, had changed by Juhan's quitclaim and assignment of an undivided one-half interest to Equity Oil
Company on January 11, 1946, Exhibit A-21. Equity Oil
Company under date of December 30, 1947, by a similar
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docmnent, Exhibit A-~4, assigned its interest to Weber
Oil Company, its "'"holly owned subsidiary. On July 12,
1948 Juhan quitclaimed a one-fourth interest to Stock,
Exhibit ...~-:23, to be followed on December 30, 1948 by
an operating agree1nent of that date, Exhibit A-25, wherein and an1ong other things it was agreed between Weber,
Stock and Juhan that the working interests in and to the
entire leasehold were held 50% by Weber, 25% by Stock
and 257o by Juhan, with Equity Oil Company as operator.
Thus 'vas the record status of the oil and gas leasehold
estates, excluding the North Forty and giving no effect
to the so-called Stock release as of the time of the second
trial, June 26, 1950, and at the time of the quitclaim deed
from Meagher to his children dated January 27, 1948,
Exhibit A-22, and concerning which instrument we will
have more to say.
On the other side of the chart, Exhibit A-62, the fee
title was in the Sheridans et al. on June 4, 1924, the date
of the R. C. Hill lease, by which lease a landowners
royalty of 120% was reserved in favor of the lessors,
the Sheridans et al. On November 14, 1924, by a warranty
deed, Exhibit A-4, the Sheridans conveyed toM. P. Smith.
Out of the landowners royalty Smith proceeded to carve
out royalty interests by way of covenants running with
the land totaling 120% in all, evidenced by assignments
and agreements of which Exhibit A-46 is not only an
example but gives to Meagher a royalty interest of 1%.
Meagher thereafter, as evidenced by Exhibit A-52, secured an additional 1% royalty interest from T. G.
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Alexander. The two exhibits last mentioned are not
shown on the chart but disclose two of the royalty in' the modification agreement of May
terests referred to in
21, 1927. The latter instrument accounts for the entire
so-called landowners royalty converted into the form of
covenants and disposed of by Smith before the modification agreement and before a quitclaim of an undivided
one-fifth interest, with exceptions and reservations, to
T. G. Alexander, Exhibit A-8, and a quitclaim of an undivided four-fifths interest with the same exceptions and
reservations

~to

Meagher, Exhibit A-7. These documents

are shown on the chart and are both dated December 19,
1927.
Exhibits A-7 and A-8, with the exceptions and reservations therein contained, will be analyzed at some length.
They are important in determining the nature of
Meagher's interest as the owner of surface rights as distinguished from possible future reversions, the nature
of the interest quitclaimed by Meagher to his children
on June 27, 1948, Exhibit A-22, and the effectiveness of
the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944 as a surrender,
relinquishment or release. It can be said, however, that
Meagher, at the time of the commencement of this action
·on October 17, 1944 and at the time of the so-called Stock
release on October 21, 1944 and up to the quitclaim of
January 27, 1948, was the owner of at least surface rights
subject to the lease of June 4, 1924 as modified by the
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agreen1ent of niny 21, 19~7. On January 27, 1948 the
children of N. J. ~Ieagher becan1e the owners of at least
surfaee rights by virtue of the quitclai1n deed of that
day.
When the trial court per1nitted Meagher to amend
his reply by the order of ~\. ugust 3, 1949, practically eleven months after the discovery of oil, a new eleinent was
injected into the case. Meagher claims, and the trial
court has so held, ihe Stock release to be a conveyance
of the oil rights possessed by Stock on Oct.ober 21, 1944.
If ~leagher obtained any right by reason of the release
it was a right acquired after the commencement of this
action. Over objections the court permi,tted the new matter to be so litigated, considering the amended reply to
l)e germane to the cause of action or complaint as originally filed. The injection of the new issue after the
first appeal to this court, and after the discovery of oil,
is perhaps a question preliminary to consideration of the
release itself.
At the time of the trial on June 26, 1950 Meagher
further amended his second amended complaint (R. 230),
the effect of which was to reduce the outstanding oil
royalty interests carved out of the landowners royalty
by M. P. Smith to 100% rather than 12lj2 % on the theory
that Meagher, at the time of the trial, was the owner of
a 2% royalty interest merging in his claim of ownership
to the entire property, interjecting for the first time this
issue into the case but with the understanding that the
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defendants, 'vithout the necessity of arnendment or further pleading, should be deemed to have controverted
any assertion resulting from the amendments and that
they might raise any legal or equitable defense which, by
any manner of pleading, could have been brought into the
case (R. 232. ) Plaintiff's counsel stated, for the record,
that the issue with respect to the royalty, as brought in
by amendment, is whether Meagher is entitled to 2%
or to 1-1/3% oil royalty interest, and this for the reason
that, as counsel stated, if plaintiff did not assert such
position that he might be subjected to the doctrine of res
judicata ( R. 233).
The royalty issue comes about by a reduction of
outstanding oil royalty interests, as evidenced by Exhibit
A-40, whereby Meagher assigned erne-third of his 2%
oil royalty interest to Stock and Phebus. There is no
prayer for specific performance in any of plaintiff's
pleadings and the controlling issue, with regard to the
one-third of 2% oil royalty interest claimed by Meagher,
is whether he can claim the same in an action to quiet
title such as we have here or whether his proper remedy,
if any he has, is that of specific performance, where issues of laches, estoppel, performance and the like can
be litigated.
Among the "A" series of exhibits, in the order of
their date, is correspondence between Meagher on the
one hand, or on his behalf, and Stock, Phebus and Juhan
or some of them on the other hand, or on their behalf

'
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Exhibits _._-\.-26 to A-39, both inclusive . The theory of the
exhibits just Inentioned is that through the1n, or some of
the1n, will appear a situation that "\Vould Inake it a fraud
for ~Ieagher to clain1 the Stock instru1nent of October 21,
19-!-l: as a tran:5fer or conveyance of interest, and through
'vhich exhibits, or some of them, appears one or more
of the various estoppels relied upon defensively by Stock.
Attached at the end of this brief is a chronology
under Appendix "B" of events which we trust will be of
help to the court by way of ready reference to our statement of the case and aid the court in putting each event
in its proper chronological setting, thus demonstrating
the equities in favor of these appellants and the inequitable position of respondent.
Upon the record showing the position of the parties,
the inducement, lack of consideration in connection with
the so-called Stock release, the stale demands attempted
to be asserted by Meagher, the inconsistent position taken
by Meagher's pleadings and Meagher's utter lack of
any position of equity in the premises, the attack upon
the decree appealed from and the findings and conclu-.
sions follows :
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The court erred in permitting Meagher to amend
his reply and to assert in this action a purported
title acquired after the commencement thereof.

2.

Meagher is not the real party in interest.
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3.

4.

Meagher is guilty of laches and is . otherwi~e
estopped by his conduct to assert an tnterest tn
the leasehold mineral estate.
Under the undisputed facts in the case the assertion of the Stock release as a conveyance or
transfer of interest constitutes fraud.

5.

Exhibit A-30 lacks consideration.

6.

A-30 should be cancelled on the ground of mis-

take.
7.

A-30 is abortive as a surrender or relinquish-

ment.
(a) The purported surrender is not to all of the
oil mineral estate as required by A -5.
(b) The purported surrender lacks consideration.
(c) Stock did not have the power to surrender
a portion of the oil mineral leasehold estate,
even if that was his intention.
(d) Meagher is not a reversioner of the oil or
gas mineral estate.
8.

A-30 is not effective as a transfer.

9.

Meagher's alleged oil royalty interest cannot
be adjudicated in this action.

ARGUMENT
1.

THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MEAGHER
TO AMEND HIS REPLY AND TO ASSERT IN THIS
ACTION A PURPORTED TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER
THE COMMENCEMENT THEREOF.

Throughout the entire case, and until ·the decision
of this court on the first appeal in 1947, and after the
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discovery of oil in 1948, l\Ieagher's position was that he
was the owner in fee of the lands involved unencumbered
by any oil and gas lease. The amended reply ordered
filed August 3, 1949 was a little less than eleven months
after the discovery of oil and more than sixteen months
after the filing of the remittitur on the first appeal,
wherein this court held that the lands involved were subject to and encumbered by the lease of June 4, 1924 and
the modification agreement of May 21, 1927. The
amended reply alleged ownership of an undivided onehalf interest in the leasehold, a position inconsistent with
and a complete departure from Meagher's p-revious pleadings in this action, and particularly the verified reply
that he filed on October 10, 1945 (R. 41), wherein he took
the position that the lease and modification thereof had
terminated by their express terms, had been forfeited and
abandoned and were otherwise null and void. The discovery of oil on the premises, pursuant to the activities
of Equity Oil Company, made Meagher's situation a
desperate one and caused him to reach out for anything,
no matter how ill conceived or inconsistent, so as to
benefit by the capital and resourcefulness of others.
Meagher is now, and during all of these proceedings has
been, a banker of Vernal, Utah.
The attempt to inject the new issue by the amended
reply was met by specific objections (R. 83), which were
denied and overruled, the ruling resulting in the order
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of August 3, 1949. These maneuvers all occurred prior to
the adoption of the present Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The principle that one cannot, by amendment or by
reply, introduce a new or different cause of action is
well established. As to an amended complaint this court
in Marshall v. Salt Lake City e{ al. (1943), 105 Utah 111,
141 P. 2d 704, said : "Of course, it is fundamental that
an amendment which states an entirely new and different
cause of action should not be permitted." As to a reply
this court in Combined Metals, Inc., et al. v. Bastian et al.
(1928), 71 Utah 535, 267 P. 1020, had the following to say:
"The reply thus was not only inconsistent
within itself, but stated a different cause, on a
different theory, on a different ground, and on a
different contract from that stated in the complaint, and was a complete departure therefrom.
It, of course, is familiar doctrine that where allegations of a declaration are repugnant to and
inconsistent with each other, they thereby neutralize each other and render the declaration bad on
general demurrer; that cause of action alleged
in an amended petition, though founded on the
same grievance or injury as that described in the
original, is a different cause of action, if it is dependent upon different grounds for holding the
defendant responsible for the wrong alleged; and
that the power of a court to permit an amendment
of ~ p!eading ~oes not authorize an importation
which In effect Introduces a new or different cause
of action. Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah, 26, 148 P.
452; Johnson v. American S. & R. Co., 80 Neb.

a
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255, 116 N.W. 517; Kirton v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 57 Fla. 79, 87, -±9 So. 1024; Herlihy v. Little,
200 Mass. 284, 86 N.E. 294; Altpeter v. Postal Tel.
Cable Co., 26 Cal. App. 705, 148 P. 241; Blair v.
Brailey (C.C.A.) 221 F. 7."
To the same effect are the cases of Graham v. Street et al.
(1946), 109 lTtah 460, 166 P. 2d 524, Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Clegg (1943), 103 Utah 414, 135 P. 2d
919, Johnson et ux. v. Brinkerhoff et al. (1936), 89 Utah
530, 57 P. 2d 1132 and Straw v. Temple et al. (1916), 48
Utah 258, 159 P. 44.
The statutory provision in effect at the time of the
filing of the amended reply was that a reply could not be
inconsistent with the complaint. We quote from subsection (b) of Section 104-11-1, Utah Code Annotated
1943 on the contents of a reply, as follows:
"Any new matter not inconsistent with the
complaint, constituting a defense to the matter
alleged in the answer; or the matter in the answer
may be confessed, and any new matter alleged,
not inconsistent with the complaint, which avoids
the same." (Italics ours).
The inconsistency of Meagher's position is obvious.
The entire title theory of his complaint including the
second amended complaint has been entirely abandoned.
He no longer seeks to quiet title to 440 acres of the land
involved, but now seeks, through the medium of his
amended reply to say that the lease, which he said before
did not exist, does exist and that he has an undivided
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interest therein. Furthermore, the right that Meagher
now asserts was acquired after the commencement of
this action and still further and before the amendment
'
the same was quitclaimed to his children on January 27,
1948, Exhibit A-22, which leads us to the next point.
2.

MEAGHER IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

That respondent Meagher is not the real party in
interest was raised by objections to plaintiff's motion to
re-open and file amended reply (R. 83), and concerning
which the affidavit of J. W. Ensign, with exhibit attached,
was in the record, having been filed May 9, 1949 (R. 75).
The exhibit attached to the Ensign affidavit is a certified copy of the photostat received in evidence as Exhibit A-22. Katherine Meagher Ivers, one of the grantees
named in ·the deed, testified that she claimed to be one
of the beneficial owners of the working interest in the
leasehold estate by virtue of the quitclaim (R. 310).
Meagher, by paragraph 6 of his reply to answer and
counterclaim of defendant Paul Stock (R. 110), served
October 15, 1949, alleges that "plaintiff and his said grantees have thus far elected to continue this action in the
name of plaintiff." No testimony was adduced at the trial
by Meagher that the action was being maintained as alleged. In that regard Finding of Fact numbered 45 is
entirely unsupported by the evidence.
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'\"'"hile '\Ye do not concede that a leasehold interest
ean be transferred by quitclaiin deed, the question of the
respondent not being the real party in interest was
argued and the point overruled and denied on the theory
that the quitclaim was an efficient document for the
transfer pendente lite of respondent's alleged interest
in the leasehold to his children and that he maintains the
action in his own name for the benefit of his grantees
under Section 104-3-19, Utah Code Annotated 1943. The
section is as follows :
"An action or proceeding does not abate by
the death or any disability of a party, or by the
transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of
action or proceeding survives or continues. In
case of the death or any disability of a party, the
court, on motion, may allow the action or proceeding to be continued by or against his representative or successor in interest. In the case of any
other transfer of interest, the action or proceeding
may be continued in the name of the original
party, or the court may allow the person to whom
the transfer is made to be substituted in the action
or proceeding."
The foregoing statute was in effect at the time of the
quitclaim and at the time the matter was raised in a pro-cedural way. The section has been re-written under our
present Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 25 (c), as
follows:
" (c) In case of any transfer of interest, the
action may be continued by or against the original
party, unless the court upon motion directs the
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person to whom the interest is transferred .t~· be
substituted in the action or joined with the original
party * * *."
We believe that respondent contends Exhibit A-22
to be an effective document assigning, transferring and
setting over unto his children, the grantees· named therein, whatever interest he acquired from Stock through the
medium of Exhibit A-30. Assuming, for the purpose of
argument, but not conceding the efficiency of the document for the purpose stated, these appellants take the
position that the plaintiff is not no"v the real party in
interest nor has he been since the quitclaim in favor of
his children, either under Section 104-3-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, in effect at the time of the conveyance or
under rule 17 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, now in
effect, by which latter provision it is required that every
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest. The abatement statute or the statute or rule
providing for the continuance of an action in the name
of the original party, even though there is a transfer of
interest pendente lite, can only apply to a matter then in
litigation and cannot be applicable to a si~tuation such
as the one we have where the alleged right became
vested in the transferror, the plaintiff in the action, after
the commencement of the suit and was transferred by
him prior to the amendment. Meagher, did not acquire
any right from Stock under any conceivable theory until
October 21, 1944, nor did he assert the alleged right until
his proposed third amended complaint on April 22, 1949.
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In the meantiiue he quitelailned to his children on J anuary 27, 1948 and his children, as the record shows, claim
to be the beneficial owners of the interest respondent
claims to have obtained from Stock, yet they are not
parties to this action.
The proposition that ~Ieagher is not the real party in
interest tmder the existing circumstances is well illustrated by the New York case of Foster v. Central Nat~
Bank of Boston et al. (1906), 76 N. E. 338. Briefly stated,
Foster in 189~ brought an action against the bank
and others praying as relief that the enforcement of a
judgment theretofore obtained in the United States Circuit Court be perpetually enjoined and restrained and
also that the judgment be discharged and satisfied. On
the 13th day of March, 1901, the action still pending,
Foster served an amended complaint in which, instead of
praying for injunctive relief, he demanded judgment for
the recovery of sums paid by himself and another to certain certificate holders on account of the judgment in the
United States Court. The answer of the defendant alleged, and the trial court found, !that in 1896 the plaintiff
Foster made a general assignment of his property for
the benefit of his creditors to one Pell W. Foster and that
on the 12th day of March, 1901, one day prior to the
amended complaint, Pell W. Foster, the assignee, sold the
claim, the subject of the amendment, to a third party.
The trial court held that the plaintiff was not entitled
to maintain the action and rendered a judgment dismissing the complaint.
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The New York Court of Appeals called attention
to the code of that state, which requires an action to be
brought by the real party in interest, and to the code
provision that "in case of a transfer of interest, or devolution of liability, the action may be continued, by or
against the original party; unless the court directs the
person, to whom the interest is transferred, or upon
whom the liability is devolved, to be substituted in the
action, or joined with the original party, as the case requires." The court pointed out that the original cause
of action and that presented by the amended complaint
upon which the cause proceeded to trial were essentially
different; the one being to restrain the enforcement of
a judgment, and the other to recover monies paid. As
to the situation, which we point out is strikingly in point
with the case at bar, the court had the following to say:
"But granting the power of amendment to the
greatest extent, that is to say, that a plaintiff by
bringing an action on one claim may keep alive,
despite any lapse of time, every other claim that
he may have of the same character against a
party, or if the claims be of a different character,
on abandoning th.e first, he may substitute for it
any other claim * * * theTe must be some limit to
the doctrine. That limit is that at the time he seeks
to bring in different causes of action he must be
the owner of the causes of action. Any other rule
would lead to injustice and gross inco.nsistency if
not t~ ab~ur~ ~on~equences. If one chooses to buy
a claim In litigation he necessarily assumes the
risk of such litigation. The Code allows him to
come into the action and prosecute his rights. If
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he fails to do so, and an adverse result is suffered through the neglect of his assignor, the fault
is his o"\vn. But it \Yould seen1 manifestly unjust
that the purchaser of a chose in action, which is
not in litigation, of \vhich assignment he gives
notice to the debtor, can be affected by the subsequent acts of his assignor. Take the present case.
If the purchaser fro1n the general assignee cannot
be concluded by any decision on the merits in this
suit, then the defendant should not be subjected
to it. On 110 theory can we justify the prosecution
through the an~endment of an existing suit of a
claim in which, under the findings of the court,
the plaintiff has no interest, and which, until the
time of the amendment, was not in litigation. The
assertion of such a claim must be left exclusively
to its owner, who may deal with it as he will."
(Italics ours).
In the instant case the Stock release was not in existence at the time the action was commenced. A suit to
quiet title and to remove as a cloud the lease of June 4,
1924 and the subsequent modification agreement is utterly inconsistent with the contention that Meagher is
the owner of an interest in the leasehold estate through
the medium of the Stock release. Then we add to this the
quitclaim to the children,. not parties to this action, which
Meagher treats as an assignment of the interest that he
says he obtained from S:tock, to be followed a year or
more later by the assertion of that claim for the first time
in this action, which brings the case strictly within the
rule in the Foster case. Meagher is attempting, through
his amended reply in the present action, to assert a claim
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which, until the time of the amendment, was not in litigation and which claim he had assigned, according to his
own evidence, to his children prior to rthe amendment.
As in the Foster case the assertion of such a claim, if any
there be, must be left exclusively to its owners who may
deal with it as they will.
At the time Meagher quitclaimed to his children on
January 27, 1948 he was still asserting by his petition for
rehearing pending in this court that a leasehold did not
exist. He is hardly in a position to say that he anticipated
an adverse ruling on his petition and that he had in mind
an interest in the leasehold when he made ithe conveyance.
The document itself, unorthodox in its form as a transfer
of an oil and gas leasehold interest, made at the time it
was, negatives an intent on the part of Meagher to transfer that which he later and on August 3, 1949 said existed.
He made no mention of a leasehold interest. His intent
evidenced by surrounding circumstances, (1) the failure
to previously assert under the instrument of October 21,
1944, (2) the decision of this court in October 1947, (3)
the filing of a petition for rehearing on the theory that
a leasehold did not exist, and ( 4) the form of the instrument itself wi!th the only chose in action e·xcluded being
that of a royalty, was not to transfer with the quitclaim
an interest in the leasehold.
If we are correct in what has just been said, it might
well be ~that this point, that Meagher is not the real party
in interest, is not well taken. Furthermore, the technical
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argument raised by point nurubered 1 might well be resolved against us by our argtunent hereafter that Meagher is debarred by the doctrine of laches or estoppel
to assert a leasehold estate arising before the quitclaim
to the children, or by our further argument, as will appear, that the Stock instrument transferred nothing.
3.

MEAGHER IS GUILTY OF LACHES AND IS OTHERWISE ESTOPPED BY HIS CONDUCT TO ASSERT
AN INTEREST IN THE LEASEHOLD MINERAL
ESTATE.

If Meagher had the right to amend his reply on
August 3, 1949, almost eleven n1onths after the discovery
of oil, to allege the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944
as a transfer, he had the right to amend his ·pleadings
iinmediately upon receiving the instrument, four days
after the commencement of the action. Meagher remained
silent from October 21, 1944 until August 3, 1949 in claiming that the instrument was effective for any purpose.
As a matter of fact, he did not particularize as to his
general allegations of transfer until October 17, 1949,
the date of his reply to the answer and counterclaim of
Stock (R. 107), when he at~tempted to earmark the Stock
instrument as a quitclaim, assignment or transfer of
interest in support of his previous general allegations.
The assertion of interest is too late; it falls into thecategory of a stale demand.
On April 14, 1945 by a quitclaim deed and assignrnent, Exhibit A-19, recorded in the office of the County
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Recorder, Uintah County, on April 25th of the same year,
Stock repudiated A-30 as an instrument of conveyance.
The quitclaim and assignment was in favor of Charles
S. Hill and concerning which Meagher not only had constructive but actual knowledge. The fact ~hat he had actual knowledge is evidenced by his letter to Stock under
date of June 18, 1945, Exhibit A-39, wherein he says in
part:
"I was surprised to find that you gave a quitclaim deed to one Chas. Hill of Denver for your
intere.sts in the 480 acres of land, which I own and
have owned."
Uintah County is a sparsely populated locality. It is
a matter of general knowledge that the well drilled by
Equity Oil Company on the property in question, ten
miles southeast of Vernal, resulted in the first commercial discovery of oil in this state. The record shows the
date to have been September 18, 1948. Meagher, a banker
of Vernal, the county seat of Uintah County, with an
admitted surface interest in the property, could hardly
say that he was unaware of what was going on. He made
no effort to explain the delay.
Meagher turned his back on the Stock instrument as
a transfer or conveyance, or as a document effective for
any purpose ( 1) when he failed to assert thereunder upon
receipt of the same, four days after the commencement
of this action, (2) when he took the position by his first
reply, verified on September 1, 1945, that the oil and gas
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lease had ceased to exist, 'vas null and void and had been
abandoned, (3) 'Yhen he accepted the fruits of the first
decree, 'Yhich restrained and enjoined the appellants and
those clainring under the1n, or any of them, fron1 entering
upon the property for the purpose of further drilling,
(-!) \Yhen he failed to ti1nely assert under the said Stock
docun1ent after the first opinion of this court, October
27, 19-!7, ( 5) "\vhen he quitclaimed to his children, and ( 6)
when he permitted Equity Oil Company to go into possession on _A_ ugust 1, 1948, commence drilling operations
on that day, successfully complete the well on the following September 18th, sitting by in silence, not only during
the drilling operations but until August of 1949 after
the enterprise had resulted in financial success, and, in
the interim, avoiding the financial risks of the venture.
In a preliminary way, we remark that the burden
was upon respondent to show excuse, if any he had, for
his failure to assert his claim promptly. As is said in
30 C.J.S., Page 544, Article "Equity", Section 120:
"Where the delay is apparently unreasonable,
the burden of showing an excuse therefor rests on
plaintiff, the presumption being that the delay is
inexcusable if the lapse of time is a long one, or if
complainant does not avail himself of an opportunity to explain his unusual delay;** *."
We must always keep in mind that equity seeks to do
justice and avoid injustice, and acts only in accordance
with good faith and fair dealing (30 C.J.S., Page 456,
Article "Equity", Section 89).
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Laches of course is such delay in asserting one's
'
'
rights as works
disadvantage
or prejudice to another.
The reason for the equitable estoppel rule is much the
same as laches. The facts here support both laches and
equitable estoppel, and they are considered together.
Equity demands of everyone the duty required of an
honest man.
These appellants at every moment acted in good
faith as reasonable men, willing to risk their money,
their work and their skill in a speculative enterprise.
They successfully defended their title against the attempt
to destroy it. Relying upon that good title so won, they
proceeded with development, the expensive and very
risky drilling of a well, the wildest of wildcats, distant
perhaps fifty miles from the nearest oil well in Colorado,
and in a state and a large region where oil had never been
found before. Yes, they knew of the so-called "Release"
(Juhan and Equity had constructive knowledge by record), but they also knew that Stock, who executed this
release, repudiated it on April 14, 1945 by his deed to
Hill, and it was also repudiated by the subsequent transactions between these appellants, leading to the drilling
of the well. They knew that Stock had given the instrument under misapprehension, that it was without consideration, that respondent in the long litigation concerning the title to :the lease, never made the slightest claim
under the same, and that though this court on October
27, 1947 decided against respondent on the question of
the existence of the lease, respondent did not about
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.J..\.ugust 1, 1948, the day the well was started, and indeed
not until more than a year thereafter had elapsed, assert
any clain1 through the instrument. They also knew that
respondent obtained the so-called "Release" on the prenlise that neither Stock nor Phebus had any title, a clear
Inistake, as later determined by this court. There is not
a scintilla of evidence to put in question their good faith
and honest purpose, and as well their large expenditures
and the risks they faced.
As to respondent, he tries to gain something upon
what was undoubtedly an afterthought, based on a writing almost forgotten, repudiated by respondent's efforts
to procure title by an inconsistent position. N otwithstanding it was repudiated by Stock six months after it
was obtained, still respondent made no complaint. It was
a writing he had obtained gratuitously. It was obtained
from Stock without the slightest consideration. From be.ginning to end respondent did not risk anything, he did
not spend anything and is not prejudiced.
When Equity, Stock and Juhan took possession on
August 1, 1948 and started the drilling of the well, they
gave notice to all the world of all their claims, whether
such claims be legal or equitable. See Note 13 L.R.A.-N.
S. 49, quoted and approved in 105 A.L.R. 845. Perhaps
there was no occasion for respondent to assert his claim
as again Hill immediately upon notice of the Hill deed.
But when the parties took possession and started to drill,
it became his positive duty to assert the same.
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Respond~nt did not even assert his claim when the
discovery well came in on Septe1nber 18, 1948-not until
August 3, 1949, presumably to be sure that by subsequent
drilling and additional large expenditures by appellants,
he would be sure to win a fabulous reward.
Respondent's conduct falls within the condemnation
of every court. There can be nothing more abhorrent to
equity than for a man to silently watch his neighbor drill
an oil well on land claimed or owned by him, with the
intent to claim the well as his if it is a producer; otherwise to continue silent. So to do is not honest as man to
man. In equity, the doctrine of laches requires the man
who has such a claim to assert it promptly, especially
when the claim concerns speculative property being developed by the other party. There is no dissent whatever
among the authorities as to the applicable rule.
In Scott v. Crouch (1902), 24 Utah 377, 67 P. 1068,
it was held that equity will not aid stale demands -or act
without showing of conscience, good faith, and reasonable
diligence. In Ruthrauff et al. v. Silver King Western
Min. & Mill. Co. et al. (1938), 95 Utah 279, 80 P. 2d 338,
this court again committed itself to the rule. The delay
in this case has worked a disadvantage to these appellants. So far as the record is concerned Meagher makes
no effort to justify his conduct or his delay and treats
the situation as if he enjoyed, as a matter of right, the
position of being able to say to the court at this late date
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that not having succeeded on one theory in getting the
\vhole apple he ean turn around and succeed on an inconsistent theory and get half an apple.
In lllary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg. Co.
(1936), 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099, this court said:
~'Laches

is usually not mere delay, but standing by "~atching one change his position or delay
for such length of time that it amounts to an acquiescence." (Italics ours).
In the instant case this court held against the contention originally made by Meagher when it held that the
leasehold of June 4, 1924, as modified, was in full force
and effect. Equity Oil Company was in possession of the
land in question on August 1, 1948 when it commenced
the discovery well, which resulted in commercial production of oil on September 18th of that year. The operating
agreement, Exhibit A-25, was a matter of public record on
January 6, 1949, the date of the recording thereof in
Uintah County. Meagher's prolonged silence was acquiescence to the adverse claims of Stock, Juhan, Weber and
Equity Oil Company in and to the leasehold.
Meagher's conduct comes clearly within the expression of the court in Alexander v. Phillips Petroleum Co.

et al., 130 F. 2d 593, 605, (lOth C.C.A. 1942):

"A person may not withhold his claim awaiting the outcome of a doubtful enterprise and, after
the enterprise has resulted in financial success
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favorable to the claimant, assert his interes~, especially where he has thus avoided the risks of the
enterprise. The injustice of permitting one, holding the right to as~ert an interest i~ prope~ty of
a speculative character, to voluntarily await the
event and then decide, when the danger is over and
the risk has been that of another, to come in and
share the profit, is obvious. In such circumstances,
persons having claims to property are bound to
use the utmost diligence in enforcing them.
A substantial increase in the value of the
property involved, where the right could have been
asserted before such increase and the granting of
relief would work inequity, is a circumstance
which may be considered in applying the doctrine
of laches.
Where a plaintiff, with knowledge of the
relevant facts, acquiesces for an unreasonable
length of time in the assertion of a right adverse
to his own, the court may presume assent to the
adverse right, and the consequent waiver of the
right sought to be enforced."
The Alexander case, supra, cites with approval the
Tenth Circuit case of Winn et al. v. Shugart et al. (1940),

112 F. 2d 617:
"The duty to act with dispatch is especially
imperative where one claims an interest in property that is highly speculative. One may not withhold his claim to a highly speculative venture such
as was involved in these wildcat oil and gas ieases
and permits, to await the outcome of an effort to
develop them put forth by another, and then when
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his efforts are crowned \vith apparent ~uccess,
rome in and claim the fruits thereof. Such a course
does not eon1mend itself to a court of equity."
The recent decision of the Tenth Circuit in Pfister
et al. v. Cow Gulch Oil Co. et al., 189 F. 2d 311, decided
~Iay 18, 1951, is in point on the principle stated. The
lessor stood by and watched the assignee of the lessee
commence, drill and complete a valuable oil well without
making objection or making any claim that the lease had
terminated. After the well was completed as a producer
the appellant, the lessor, asserted the claim of termination. The appellee claimed laches. The delay was approximately three months. While the court decided that
the lease did not automatically terminate and, "\vhile the
facts are somewhat different, the court, however, did say
that laches depends upon the equities of the case and not
merely on the lapse of time, stating in this particular:

.

"Silence under such circumstances when, according to the ordinary experience and habits of
men, one would naturally speak if he did not consent, is evidence from which assent may be inferred. Where a plaintiff, with knowledge of the
relevant facts, acquiesces for an unreasonable
length of time in the assertion of a right adverse
to his own, the court may presume assent to the
adverse right, and the consequent waiver of the
right sought to be enforced."
This court in Migliaccio v. Davis et al., 232 P. 2d
195 (Utah), decided June 8, 1951, voices its approval of
the rule stated in 19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, paragraph 133,
page 787:
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" 'Numerous decisions predicating the existence of an estoppel to assert an interest in real
property have been based up?n evidence wh~ch
included the element of non-disclosure of an Interest at the time when the contract for the conveyance of the property in question was being
consummated and also the element of a continued
silence after the grantee had entered into possession of the property and expended money in improving it. In most of the cases in which the doctrine of estoppel has been adopted, the money of
the party alleging the estoppel has been applied
to the making of tangible improvements; and it
is a rule almost of universal application that one
who stands by and sees another purchase land or
enter upon it under a claim of right and permits
such other to make expenditures or improvements
under circumstances which would call for notice
or protest cannot afterward assert his own title
against such person. As some of the authorities
broadly state the principle, one who knowingly
and silently permits another to expend money on
land under a belief that he had title will not be
permitted to set up his own right to the exclusion
of the rights of the one who made such improve·
ments * * * .' " (Italics ours).
In the Migliaccio case it is said that an "exception
to this rule is applied to one who improves or expends
the money when he is acquainted with the true character
of his title or with the fact that he has none." F·rom this
it may be argued that the Stock instrument was of record
and that, if effective as a conveyance, appellants should
have been aware of such construction. It must be borne
in mind, however, that Meagher himself had placed no
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such interpretation upon the document and that his assertion in that regard caine long after the discovery of
oil and after his disclaimer to his children by way of his
quitclaim deed to them.

Furthermore, as previously

shown, Stock repudiated the so-called release, and of this,
respondent had knowledge. Whether Stock was right or
wrong, it cannot be said of Stock that he spent his share
of money 'vhen he knew that he had no title. All the
testimony in the case is convincing that not only Stock,
but his associates, believed or had reason to believe that
their title was good.
The court also said in the Migliaccio case :
"The general rule of equitable estoppel is set
forth in the following language in 19 Am. Jur.,
page 634, Sec. 34: '* * * Equitable estoppel or
estoppel in pais is the principal by which a party
who knows or should know the truth is absolutely
precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying or asserting :the contrary of, any material fact,
which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or
negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably
ignorant of the true facts and who had a right to
rely upon such words and conduct, to believe and
act upon them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in
such a way that he would suffer injury if such
denial or contrary assertion were allowed.'"
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And further :
"In addition' it would appear contrary
to .com.
.
mon sense for respondent to invest In a mining
venture without some memorandum in writing if
.
"
he knew he had no interest on the c1aims.
The case is also valuable because the court considered the argument that the party claiming estoppel
had knowledge of a prior unrecorded deed, before he obtained his claimed interest in the property, and by reason
of this knowledge as to the title situation, he is precluded
from relying on the doctrine of estoppel. In spite of
this argument, the court said:
"It ill behooves appellant to contend now that
respondent should suffer the loss because he was
inexcusably negligent in not ferreting out the undisclosed truth. If appellant knew of the deed
in Hammond's possession an honest disclosure of
that fact by him at any time before August 9,
1948, might have permitted respondent to protect
his investment by other methods."
Another very recent case is by th~ Supreme Court of
Colorado, Johnson et al. v. Neel (1951), 229 P. 2d 939.
While the facts are not analogous, the statement of the
rule certainly commends itself to the court.
-=-Portions of the syllabi say:
"Doctrine of estoppel in pais is founded on
principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid
law in administration of justice where without
its aid injustice might result.
·
* * * *
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Generally, equitable estoppel is a rule of
justice which in its proper field prevails over all
other rules and doctrine Inay be invoked to cut
off rights of privileges conferred by statute, and
constitutional rights Inay he effectively waived by
conduct consisting of action or failure to act.

* * * *
Parties who remain silent when they ought,
in exercise of good faith, to speak, will not be
heard to speak when in exercise of same good faith
they ought to remain silent."
Perhaps the leading case by the United States Supreme Court is Johnson v. Standard Mining Co. (1893),
148 U. S. 360, 13 S. Ct. 360, 37 L. Ed. 480, where the
court said:
"While there is no direct or positive testimony
that plaintiff had knowledge of what was taking
place with respect to the title or development of
the property, the circumstances were such as to
put him upon inquiry; and the law is well settled
that where the question of laches is in issue the
plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge as he
might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the
facts already known by him were such as to put
upon a man of ordinary intelligence the duty of
Inquiry.

* * * *
The duty of inquiry was all the more peremptory in this case from the fact that the property of itself was of uncertain character, and was
liable, as is most mining property, to suddenly
develop an enormous increase in value. This is
actually what took place in this case. A property
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which, in October, 1880, plaintiff sold to Cha.tfie~d
upon the basis of $4,800 for the whole mine IS
charged, in a bill filed October. 21, 1887, to be
worth $1,000,000, exclusive of Its accumulated
profits. Under such circumstances, where property has been developed by the courage and energy
and at the expense of the defendants, courts will
look with disfavor upon the claims of those who
have lain idle while awaiting the results of this
development, and will require not only clear proof
of fraud, but prompt assertion of plaintiff's
rights.* * *
The language of Mr. Justice Miller in Twin
Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 592, with
regard to the fluctuating value of oil wells, is
equally applicable to mining lodes: 'Property
worth thousands to-day is worth nothing tomorrow; and that which to-day would sell for a
thousand dollars, at its fair value, may, by the
natural changes of a week or the energy and courage of desperate enterprise, in the same time be
made to yield that much every day. The injustice,
therefore, i~ obvious of permitting one holding the
right to assert an ownership in such property to
voluntarily await the event, and then decide, when
the danger which is over has been at the risk of
another, to come in and share the profit.'"
As to equitable estoppel, relief is granted without
any reference whatever as to time. As to laches, time is
often an element. However, so far as this case is concerned, there is no difference in the equitable principles
involved. In respect to laches, our ease satisfies every
possible time consideration. The delay in the assertion of
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title \Yas nearly fiYe year~. The delay dt1ring the period
of actual "'"ell-drilling \Yas approximately seven weeks .
. .\nother case in \Yhich a clai1nant was silent and did
not speak during the drilling of a \vell, where the drilling
ti1ne \Vas particularly short, was the case of Merrill et al.
v. Rocky lllo,unta,in Cattle Co. et al. (1919), 181 P. 964
(\V.yo.). In this case, the exact dates are not given, but
the right accrued in August and oil was discovered in
October. In that case the right of the plaintiffs accrued,
if at all, in August 1914, and during ..._~ugust 1914 they
made a demand upon defendants. The defendants did not
accede to the demand but on the contrary, at about the
san1e time, granted a lease to the Ohio Oil Company,
\vhich took possession of the disputed land, and placed
casing thereon on September 21, 1914. They drilled a
well which came in during October, 1914. Suit was
brought February 13, 1915. In the Merrill case the drilling occupied about a month, whereas in the present case
it continued about seven weeks. The court, in a learned
opinion, held the short time element was not important
in view of the fact that the adverse claimant did not
assert any adverse claim during the period when the oil
and gas lease was being developed at great expense.
Another important case is Hertzel v. Weber, 283
F. 921 (8th C.C.A. 1922), a decision by Judge Lewis.
The essential facts are almost identical with the case at
bar. The so-called grantee permitted another party to
develop certain land without denying the other party's
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right to do so. The property involved was an oil leasehold. It was not until after oil was discovered that the
so-called grantee denied the other party's right to drill
the land. Of course the so-called grantee was estopped.
The following sentence from the opinion is important.
Referring to the so-called grantee the court said:
"He knew from the beginning that Weber
claimed to be in possession by right, operating
the property under valid contracts with the lessees."
And again:
"There is no testimony showing that he notified W eher at any time until he brought this suit
* * * that he claimed that Weber was in possession
without right under void contracts, and that he
intended to oust him. He sat by and permitted
Weber to continue in the hazardous venture of
mining operations, which may be profitable one
day and disastrous the next. * * * After such conduct he should be estopped on familiar principles
from thereafter asserting the contrary. * * * The
doctrine of estoppel in pais 'proceeds upon the
ground that he who has been silent as to his alleged rights when he ought in good faith to have
spoken, shall not be heard to speak when he ought
to be silent.' "
Another case is Given v. Times-Republican Printing
Co. et al., 114 F. 92, (8th C.C.A. 1902). This decision was
by Judge Sanborn. In this case it was said:
"No principle is more universal in the jurisprudence of civilized nations, no principle is more
equitable in itself or more salutary in its effects,
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than that one \Yho, by his acts or representations,
or by his silence \Yhen he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces
another to believe certain facts to exist, and the
latter rightfully acts on such a belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to
deny the existence of such facts, is thereby conclusively estopped to interpose such denial."
In Dickerson r. Colgrove et al. (1880), 100 U. S. 578,
25 L. Ed. 618, the court said :
"The estoppel here relied upon is known as an
equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais. The law
upon the subject ·is well settled. The vital principle is, that he who, by his language or conduct,
leads another to do what he would not otherwise
have done, shall not subject such person to loss or
injury by disappointing the expectations upon
which he acted. Such a change of position is
sternly forbidden. It involves fraud and falsehood, and the law abhors both. This remedy is
always so applied as to pron1ote the ends of
justice."

Crane Co. v. James McHugh Sons, Inc., et al., 108
F. 2d 55 (lOth C.C.A. 1939), a decision by Judge Phillips,
where it is said that silence when according to the ordinary experience and habits of men, one would naturally
'speak out if he did not consent, is evidence from which
consent may be inferred.
Another important case is Transcontinental Oil Co.

v. Spencer et al., 6 F. 2d 866 (5th C.C.A. 1925). This
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though in this case a well was commenced and drilled
in time, and discovered gas in one sand and salt water in
a deeper sand. The lessors claimed that thereafter lessee
did not prosecute their work with diligence. The court
said that the evidence disclosed that at least one of the
lessors, with full knowledge of suspension of operations,
stood by without raising any question as to the continued
existence of the lease and of the lessee's rights thereunder, while the latter resumed operations and prosecuted them until they resulted in the bringing in of a
paying gas well. The court held that a lessor is not entitled to occupy the inconsistent position of acquiescence
in the lessee going on under the lease, and at the same
time retaining the right to rescind for a known breach of
a condition by the lessee.
Meagher has estopped himself by the record in this
case to assert the Stock instrument as a conveyance. The
reply that he verified on September 1, 1945 was a disclaimer of the Stock release as a conveyance because in
the reply Meagher took the position that the lease did
not exist.
Furthermore, Mrs. Ivers, then Katherine C. Meagher, acting on behalf of her father, by her letter of November 9, 1944 (R. 12), placed a construction upon the
instrument as that of a release and not a conveyance and
stated, in effect, that the release was but one of several
to be obtained before the suit could be settled. Consistent
with our theory, as will be hereinafter more particularly
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pointed out, the Stork instrun1ent was abortive for any
purpose until the seenring ''of all the necessary releases
of interest," the language used by ~frs. Ivers in the letter
to the Judge of the Fourth Judicial Court under the date
above indicated. :il[eagher is in no position to say that
these appellants might have been acquainted with his
clai1n of O\Ynership of one-half of the oil mineral leasehold estate \vhen he, himself, took no such position but,
in fact, took the position of record that no lease existedthe extreme opposite.
That appellants Stock, Juhan and Weber changed
their position by reason of the delay and the acts of
Meagher, whose claim is now inconsistent with his former
position, is obvious from the operating agreement, Exhibit A-25, where, as owners of the working interests,
they obligated themselves in a number of particulars to
Equity Oil Company, as operator, including the payment
or reimbursement for all operating costs, 50% by Weber,
25% by Juhan and 25% by Stock. Operating expenses
to May 31, 1950 were in excess of $580,000.00 (R. 255256). Furthermore, Stock obligated himself on July 9,
1948, Exhibit A-51, to pay Juhan $19,500.00 for 3/16ths
of the working interest in the leasehold, of which amount
of money $6,500.00 was to go to Phebus. On the same day
Equity Oil Company committed itself to a joint venture
agreement with Stock and Juhan to prospect and develop
the property involved, Exhibit A-52.
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The existence of the leasehold having been determined by this court in its opinion of October 27, 1947,
the same having become final by the remittitur issued
under date of March 16, 1948, and Meagher, in the meantime, having disclaimed further interest in the property
by his quitclaim to his children on January 27, 1948, except for a royalty, and the Stock instrument not having
been a previous issue in the case, and, so far as the record
discloses, the Meagher children asserting no rights, all
combine to reasonably suggest the course of action taken
by Stock, Juhan, Weber and Equity Oil Company in the
wildcat venture, making it inequitable for Meagher to
now assert the contrary position, which is the basis of
the doctrine of laches and estoppel.
The failure of Meagher to assert under the circumstances in this case, which would require the utmost dili-.
gence on his part in the enforcement of his alleged rights,
presumes assent to the adverse right and the consequent
waiver of the right sought to be enforced. Finding of
Fact numbered 36 which negatives action or non-action
attributable to Meagher, and Finding of Fact nun1bered
37 that neither drilling operations nor expenditures were
induced by or were undertaken in reliance upon anything
attributable to Meagher, and that Stock and all other
parties to this action dealt with the property subject to
the exigencies of this litigation, with full knowledge that
Meagher's interests were substantially in conflict with
the claims of each defendant, and Finding of Fact numbered 41 that there has been no undue or substantial deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lay in the asssertion of the Meagher clailn, or in the proseeution of this litigation by him, are contrary to the fact
and to the la"T' as is like\vise Conclusion of Law numbered 15.
The laches and estoppel by conduct and silence disclosed by the record can be clai1ned by Phebus and Juhan
and those clai1ning by, through and under them, as well
as by Stock. As to Phebus and Juhan the matter of- further pleading by them was brought to an end by Meagher's amended reply ordered filed August 3, 1949. Possession taken on August 1, 1948 and the recording of
Exhibit A-25 on January 6, 1949 were notice to the world
of the drilling operations, the continuity of possession
and the basis of the claim thereof. Furthermore, actual
knowledge is charged to Meagher, as stated above, by his
letter to Stock of June 18, 1945, Exhibit A-39, pertaining
to the Stock-Hill instrument, Exhibit A-19.
Meagher has not only barred himself by not having
timely asserted his rights, if any, but to assert under the
Stock instrument an interest in the leasehold constitutes
a fraud, which brings us to the next point.
4.

UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE CASE
THE ASSERTION OF THE STOCK RELEASE AS
A CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER OF INTEREST
CONSTITUTES FRAUD.

Meagher did not take the witness stand nor did he
in any way attempt to explain the clear import of written
communications surrounding the execution of Exhibit
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A-30. The writings are in evidence without objection and
the problem of weight or credibility to be given oral
testimony, so often found where there is an issue of
fraud, is not present here.
On January 7, 1944, on the letterhead of Bank of
Vernal, Vernal, Utah, Meagher wrote to Stock at Cody,
Wyoming, Exhibit A-26, as follows:
"Dear Mr. Stock:

Years ago I bought all of the interests of M.
P. Smith and others to the 'Gas Well Ranch'-480
acres lying about ten miles BE of Vernal, subject
to 12¥2% outstanding royalties and the lease that
existed.
I find the records show the lease assignments
running to you, then your agreement with the
Stand~rd of Calif. for a drilling operation. The
Standard of Calif. re-assigned the lease to you
and Ray Phebus, but Archie Lewies (Lewis)
never recorded any instrument· from you and
Ray. He has abandoned the field,-gas exhausted,
-and he sold the pipe, etc. to Jos. Juhan, who
pulled the pipe and sold it.

My trouble is to clear the title of the lease
and the records stop with the above. Archie
Lewis says he got all of the interest you and Ray
had, and he says he turned all to Juhan. I can get "
Archie to sign any instrument needed to clear my
title, if necessary, but the record is what must be
cleared.
I am writing Ray, addressing my letter to
him to Thermopolis. I know he is not there, but
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I am taking a chance it will be forwarded to him.
Do you kn(nY his address J? Will you please send it
to Ine~
If you are willing to execute a release I shall
have one prepared and submitted to you, and I
will yery much appreciate your help .
. A. Yery hap·py New Year to you and all my

good wishes." (Italics ours) .
On the same day 1feagher wrote to Phebus, Exhibit
A-31, at Thermopolis, Wyoming, as follows:
"Dear Mr. Phebus:
First of all let me wish you and Mrs. Phebus
a very happy New Year. It is a long time since
you both used to be in .the 'Gas office' here,a long time since I have seen you.

Perhaps you know that Archie Lewis no
longer srnpplies gas to Vernal City,-on acco~tnt
of the field being exhausted,-and he sold the
line, etc. to J os. Juhan who pulled the pipe and
sold it.
The object of my letter is to ask if you are
willing to give a quit-claim deed or release or
some instrument that is proper to clear my title
to the land. I own the land and bought from
M. P. Smith years ago all interests, subject to
the lease and agreement, - except outstanding
royalties totaling 12¥2%. These royalties remain.
All I want is a release from you and Paul Stock,
Archie Lewis and Jos. Juhan,-successors to you.
The trouble is after you agreed with the Standard
of California for a drilling operation, which they
surrendered the assignment of the lease to you
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52

remains of record for oil. You assigned for gas
to the Ashley Valley Oil Co. or the Valley Fuel
Supply Co., or some one of those comp~ni~s w~th
(which) Archie Lewis controlled. Archi~ Is willing to do anything desired to clear my title. My
attorney advises to clear it by a quiet-title suit,
but that is not needed, if I can get quit-claim
deeds he advises. If I shall have such instrument
as is necessary prepared for this purpose are
you willing to execute it~ If so, I shall then have
it prepared and submitted to you.
I am still holding down this corner and
though not making money in banking at present
still we are making a little progress one year
after another.
Again my very best wishes to you." (Italics
ours).
The letter that immediately preceded the signing
of the Stock instrument was dated October 16, 1944,
Exhibit A-27, directed to Stock at Cody, Wyoming, and
signed by Katherine C. Meagher, the attorney daughter
of N. J. Meagher, as follows:
"Dear Mr. Stock :
As attorney for my father, Mr. N.J. Meagher,
I have started a quiet title suit in the district
court of Uintah County, but I have been assured
that you do not claim any interest of any sort
in the Ashley Oil Field and will sign a release
of any interests you had in the past, so the release
may be recorded.
The release is enclosed, and would you mind
please signing it and returning it to me by return
mail~
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~\lthough

I do not kno'v you, Mr. Stock, I've
heard so 1nany nice things about both you and
~Ir. Phebus from my father that I almost feel as
if you are an old friend of 1nine as well.
''rith kindest personal regards, I am," (Italics
ours).
The construction that Meagher placed upon the
entire situation is found in a letter, Exhibit A-28, on
the stationery of Bank of \..,.ernal, Vernal, Utah, November 9, 194-±, directed to Phebus at Englewood, California, signed by N. J. Meagher, as follows:
"Dear

~fr.

Phebus:

I have been requested for a lease on the 480
acres of land which I own and which you will
recollect as the place where you obtained gas_ for
Vernal City. Archie Lewis was here for the past
two weeks and he executed releases for the Uintah
Gas Co. and Valley Fuel Supply Co. I also obtained a release from Paul Stock. All of these are
recorded.
My daughter advised me that she heard from
you, though I have not your letter, and that you
wished to have the opinion of your attorney regarding the release. Of course, that is all right.
On the other hand your attorney may not be fully
advised of the facts; that the lease carries requirements which have not been fulfilled; that
no oil in commercial quantities was ever discovered there, and that only gas was developed
and sold, but the two companies,-Valley Fuel
Supply Co. and Uintah Gas Co.,-ceased their
operations over two years ago. The gas line was
sold to one Juhan, who pulled all the pipe from
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the wells to Vernal and pulled the connections
into the homes here. The State Utilities Commission granted a permit to Arch Lewis to cease production there over two years ago and Arch Lewis
got a decree of court dissolving both the corporations -Uintah Gas Co. and Valley Fuel Supply
Co. There is also a requirement in the lease that
on failure to do certain things the holder of the
lease rights is required to release the land. Under
these conditions will you, therefore, kindly send
in the release promptly, as I have a possibility
of getting the area drilled. Any one shies from
an area on which a lease is recorded as they do
not care to have any mixup or possibility of a
mixup if production were obtained.

I believe. you know I wo·uld not ask for surrender of anybody's rights without payment, but
in this instance actually no rights exist for anybody through that old lease of 1924. I would
therefore appreciate your kind consideration of
my request and send the release to me or to my
daughter as soon as possible. If your attorney
has not returned the release to you I shall have
another made, exactly as Paul Stock signed or as
Arch Lewis signed, except that yours is individual
and Arch's is for the corporations. There is no
responsibility attached to your giving the release;
it is merely that you have no interest in it and
any interest you had may have been assigned,
but in your releasing no instrument that you
gave of conveyance is affected. It is like giving
a quit-claim deed (not a warranty of title) which
indicates you have no interest in it. Of course,
you consulted your attorney whose advice it is
proper to follow, if he has the facts on which
to base his decision.
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Ray, have you got an abstract to that property'? I have only a partial one. I wonder if you
furnished an abstrart to the Standard of Calif.
Those leases and assignments are quite lengthy
and they clutter up the title a lot, so if there
is an abstract that I can obtain without having
the expense of that history in full, I should like
to obtain it.
I see you are enjoying a better climate than
we usually have, but I cannot object to the kind
of weather we have had during the past few
months,-just grand.
If you ever drive through this way do not
pass me by. I am at the same old stand and I shall
always be very glad to see you.
My best wishes to you always." (Italics ours).
Stock first met Meagher at Vernal in 1928 when
Phebus and Stock were building a gas line. During that
time both Phebus and Stock were in and out of Vernal,
and then after leaving Vernal they would see Meagher
on occasional visits to that part of the country. Stock
knew Meagher to be a banker of repute in that vicinity
and had never had occasion until after October of 1944
to question anything that Meagher might have represented to be a fact (R. 293-294).
The letter that Meagher wrote to Stock on January
7, 1944 was answered on Stock's behalf under date of
January 17th of that year, Exhibit A-32. Confusing
a royalty situation with Meagher's request for a release,
L. G. Hinkley, who wrote the letter to Meagher on behalf
of Stock, stated the following:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56
"Dear Mr. Meagher :
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
January 7 addressed to Mr. Paul Stock at Cody,
Wyoming. This letter has been handed to me
for reply.
Mr. Stock advises that if you will prepare the
necessary instrument to clear the outstanding
royalties on the lease mentioned in your letter
that he will sign this instrument and return the
same to you which will enable you to record same
and clear the title. I would suggest that the
instrument be prepared for the signature of Paul
Stock only, as Ray Phebus is not in this part
of the Country. I believe his address is somewhere in Illinois.
If you will write to Mr. Robert Connaghan,
Cheyenne, Wyoming, I am sure he will be able
to give you Mr. Phebus' correct address." (Italics,
ours).
The Hinkley letter is consistent with Stock's uncontradicted testimony on direct-examination when called
as a witness·for Meagher:

"Q

(By Mr. Wheat) Now when you signed
this release, this Exhibit A-30, did you understand it to be a release of all of your interests in the oil lease covering the lands involved in this suit~

A

No, sir. (R. 262).

Q.

(By Mr. Wheat) Now Mr. Stock, tell us in
your own words what your understanding was
with respect to that document. (R. 264).

;A

I thought that I was releasing to Mr. Meaghe·r
a royalty that we had obtained from him to
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drill a well. There was son1e overriding royalty and ",.e wanted to reduce the royalty,
"~hich "~e did do. And this, the overriding
royalty, amounted to so much, and if we
didn't drill the well, we had-I don't kno~
'vhether we legally give it back, we intended
to give hin1 back his royalty if we didn't
drill the well, but we did later drill the well.

·Q.

(By Mr. Wheat) But in any event, the state
of your mind at the time you executed that
document was that you were giving back to
~feagher the royalties he had transferred to
you and Mr. Phebus in order to cut down
the outstanding royalties at the time you
transferred the lease to the Standard Oil
Company, isn't that right~

A

That was right." (R. 265).

The recitals contained in Exhibit A-30, the Stock
release, are consistent with the representations made by
Meagher in his correspondence. Divorcing for the
moment any question of mistake of either fact or law,
or both, we have a clear continuity of representation
by Meagher that no interest existed and that nothing
was asked for by way of interest, all coupled with the
statement that the requested document was contractually required for ;the purpose of removing a cloud
upon a title that Meagher represented as already owning.
It was under those circumstances, and without consideration, that the release was executed. Meagher's position
as a banker in Uintah County, respected by Stock, put
him into the position of being able to assert, as a fact,
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that Stock had no interest and that he, Meagher, had
the right to require of Stock something by way of contract. This is clearly stated in the release, a document
prepared by Meagher's daughter (R. 297), as follows:
"Whereas the lessee and his assigns agreed
that upon failure to fulfill the terms of the lease,
'The lessee hereby agrees to relinquish, cancel
and surrender the same to the lessors and to clear
the record title of said lands from the lien or
burden of said lease by making, executing, acknowledging and delivering a proper conveyance
or release thereof and causing the same to be
recorded in the office of the County Clerk and
Recorder of the County where the said lands are
situated, without expense to the lessors.' "
Meagher, as one of the holders of a royalty, consented to the modification agreement of May 21, 1927,
Exhibit A-5, and is presumed to have known the contents thereof. The modification agreement of the date
mentioned, by its express terms, paragraph III thereof,
"fully discharged, superseded and replaced" the portion
of the lease of June 4, 1924 quoted in the above recital.
The release is so drafted that, by even the most casual
inspection, one could not say other than that the release
was required from Stock as a matter of contractual
stipulation, when in truth and in fact such did not exist.
Meagher took further advantage in purposely stating
by the additional recital:
"Whereas, Paul Stock derived his interests
by virtue of an assignment of the rights under
this original lease;"
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'vithout 1naking any reference to the n1odification agreeInent, kno"\\ying, or being in a position "\vhere he should
haYe kno\vn, that Stock, a ren1ote assignee of the rights
existent by virtue of the 1nodification agreement, was
not under the recited contractual disability of the original R. C. l{illlease of June -±, 1924.
Thus, :Jieagher secured the execution of the Stock
release under date of October 21, 1944, and he now, in
the face of the record and the uncontroverted documentary evidence, claims the same as a conveyance or transfer
of one-half of the oil mineral estate under the lease, as
modified-after this court has held the leasehold to exist.
The position of }feagher is unconscionable and his assertion spells fraud. The relationship of the parties, the
lack of any consideration, the overreaching and the misstatement of the factual situation can mean nothing
else.
What has been said with reference to point 3, as
to change of position and the specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law in connection therewith, are equally
applicable to this point. Furthermore, Finding of Fact
numbered 38, as follows:
"Meagher did not defraud or deceive Stock
by .previously asserting that the lease was cancelled and that Stock had no interest therein,
although Meagher now claims an interest in the
lessee's rights and contends that he acquired an
interest in the lessee's rights from Stock. The
aforesaid erroneous assertion by Meagher was not
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made with the intent to deceive or mislead Stock,
and did not deceive or mislead Stock, nor did
Stock rely thereon. No facts have been proved
upon which any fraudulent or deceitful conduct
can be attributed to Meagher with respect to Stock
or any other party to this action.",
and that portion of Finding of F·act numbered 39, as
follows:
"The recitals in A30 are attributable to
Meagher, but none were made with the intent to
deceive or mislead Stock, and said recitals did
not deceive or mislead Stock, and were not relied
upon by Stock.",
are not supported by the evidence but are contrary to
the evidence and to law. Likewise is Conclusion of Law
numbered 16 to the effect that neither Stock nor any
other defendant is entitled to rescind the alleged transfer from Stock to Meagher, document A-30, on any basis.
The recitals in A-30 are, in and of themselves, evidence
of fraud and certainly in the more charitable vein clearly
indicative of mistake.
The court in its memorandum decision considered
the question of recitals as an aid to interpretationsomething which we will discuss later-but did not consider them as evidence of mistake or fraud in the inducement of the making of the instrument. While no cases
have come to our attention like this one on their facts,
some statements of general principles in certain decided
cases, and the tacit treatment of a recital in at least one
case, may be of some assistance.
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In considering the effect of a recital in an action
brought upon 1nistake of la"T or fact, the nature of
recitals, and their purpose, should not be overlooked.

In :2 Devlin on Real Estate (3rd Ed.), Section 992,
it is said:
'~Recitals

are introduced for the purpose of
explaining 'vhy the deed is executed, or of showing circumstances which preserve the connection
in the chain of title, and are considered as being
of two kinds, particular and general."

In Jones Legal

Forn~s

(Annotated), Chapter 22,

Form 22-4, it is said :
"A brief statement of the circumstances giving rise to the agreement will often serve to
clarify other,vise doubtful provisions. Such statements are usually made in a preamble, introduced
by the word 'whereas.' "
And see 3 Nichols Cyclopedia of Legal Forms, Contracts, Section 3.14:
"It is often advisable to begin the contract,
after its formal commencement, with recitals preceded by the words 'whereas', to show the exact
condition of the parties, the subject matter, the
purpose of the contract, etc."
As said in 4 Nichols Cyclopedia of Legal Forms,
Deeds, page 66, n. 74:
"Recitals in a deed
show the reason for the
identify the parties, to
claim of title, etc. They

are often included to
conveyance, to further
explain the grantor's
are for the purpose of
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explaining why the deed is executed or of sh~"\v
ing circumstances which preserve the connection
in the chain of title."
And in 6 Thompson on Real Property, Section 3186,
page 346, it is said:
"The office of narrative recitals is ·to state
the facts and instruments through which the
grantor's title is deduced; and the office of introductory recitals is to explain the motive of the
grantor in making the conveyance."
The authorities above quoted indicate that a recital
IS often used to show the motive (i.e. inducement) of
a transaction. In basing a case upon mistake or misrepresentation it, of course, must be shown that the
grantor was mistaken as to a fact, and that the fact
induced the contract or whatever we have here. That
the facts were not true, we have a Supreme Court
decision, the law o{ the case, to show this. But is 1the
judge justified in finding that the mistake did not induce
the transaction~
Wigmore, in speaking of the difference between
contracts or transactions which are void, and those which
are voidable, in IX Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.)
Section 2423, says :
"So far, then, as an act is held to be voidable, it must be for some other reason than one
of the foregoing elements, that is, some reason
which concedes that the act is jural and lawful
in its subject, intelligible and definite in its terms,
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and final in its utterance, and that in all these
respects there existed in the actor an intention
to do the act, or a volition having consequences
equivalent to intention.
The inquiry, therefore, is, What is the distinction between these elements, the lack of which
leaves the act void, and those other elements
'vhich 1nerely make the act voidable?
The other ele1nents are all reducible finally
to a single consideration, namely, that of motive,
-i.e. the relation between the actor's state of
mind and some fact external to himself and his
act. This consideration of Motive falls under
three general heads :
When the fact creating the motive is
somewhere mentioned in the terms of the act, it
is commonly spoken of as a Condition, i.e. a
reservation of an option to annul. Conditions may
be established by express stipulation in the act,
or by implication of law. Of the latter sort may
be, for example, in contracts, a description of a
horse's pedigree; in deeds, a description of land
as containing specified buildings; in wills, a recital (incorrectly) of the death of an elder son
as the reason for devising to a younger one. * * *"
1.

A statement which seems to fit in with the general
discussion here IS that found in Holmes, The Common
Law, page 326:
"It is not then true, as it is sometimes said,
that the law does not concern itself with the
motives for making contracts. On the contrary,
the whole scope of fraud outside the contract is
the creation of false motives and the removal of
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true ones. And this consideration will afford a
reasonable test of the cases in which fraud will
warrant rescission. It is said that a fraudulent
representation must be material to have that
effect. But how are we to decide whether it is
material or not~ If the above argument is correct it must be by an appeal to ordinary experience
to decide whether a belief that the fact was as
represented would naturally have led to, or a
contrary belief would naturally have prevented,
the making of the contract."
In A.dam.son et ux. v. Brockbank et al. (1947), 112
Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264, one of the~rockhanks importuned
respondents to sign a quitclaim deed, after repeatedly
informing them that the sole purpose of the deed was
to clear up a discrepancy in the boundary line between
appellants' and respondents' property.

In order to

finance a construction program originating with the
Brockbanks, who with others were appellants, it was
necessary to secure title insurance which could not be
done until the title to the strip in dispute was cleared.
One of the appellants, repeatedly informed respondents
that the sole purpose of the deed was to clear up the
discrepancy in the boundary and thereupon respondents executed the deed. No consideration was paid for
the deed and no discussion was had with respect to
releasing respondents' rights to the use of a ditch, the
subject of the action, and for the destruction of which ·
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pellants as well as cancellation of the quitclaim. As
to Brockbank's (one of the grantors) intention, the
court said:
" . A. ppellant Brockbank never considered that
respondents had quitclaimed their right to the
use of the ditch until he discussed it with his
attorney, and if Alan E. Brockbank intended to
obtain more than a correction of an erroneous
description, then he misrepresented his intentions
to respondents."

The court points out that respondents did not understand that their rights to the use of the· ditch were
included in the deed and that they relied on the statements of the appellant Brockbank to the effect that the
deed was only for the purpose of clearing up the discrepancy; further, Brockbank, one of the appellants,
had knowledge of the existence of the easement and he
knew that his representations as to the purpose and
effect of the quitclaim were not true. The trial court
set aside the deed and this court sustained the ruling.
On the question raised by appellants that the alleged
fraud and misrepresentation did not support the action
of the trial court this court said :

"* * * appellant Brockbank made a representation of a material fact in that he represented
that the purpose of the deed was solely to clear
up the discrepancy in the boundaries. That such
representation was false is amply supported by
the acts and conduct of appellant Brockbank. He
was in the real estate business, had handled
many conveyances of property, was familiar with
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the legal effect of deeds, prepared the deed so it
covered more property than was intended, denied
he intended to include the rights to the use of
the ditch, and yet later insisted that the deed
has extinguished respondents' rights. The court
found that during the time Brockbank was negotiating with respondents for this quitclaim deed
he had knowledge of the existence of the easement, and although he testified to the contrary,
the court was fully justified in disbelieving his
testimony. * * * When Brockbank made the statement to respondents that the only effect of the
deed was to clear up the existing discrepancy in
the boundary lines, he did not actually believe,
upon reasonable grounds, that the representation
was true. The representation was made with
intention that it would be acted upon, and was
acted upon by respondents to their detriment.
Furthermore, respondents were obviously ignorant of its falsity, yet reasonably believed it to be
true. These facts, under the rules of law previously announced by this court, clearly makes out
a case of fraud and misrepresentation."
The case of Burton v. Haden et al. (1908), 60 S.E.
736 (Va.), is an oft-cited case in the field of restitution.
The action was one to set aside and annul a conveyance
of real property because of the mutual mistake as to
the interest and title of the grantor in the tract conveyed. In discussing the question of mistake the court
said:
"It appears from the deed itself that the
grantor was of opinion that she had title to only
an undivided one-third interest, and that E. H.
Burton, the grantee, already had title to the remaining two-thirds interest."
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The defense 'Yas that the deed was a compromise
of doubtful rights and that the n1istake, if any, was· one
of la'v. Said the court :
''We do not think the claim that the deed
was the result of compromise of doubtful rights
can be maintained. It presents none of the elements of a compromise. The grantee claimed a
two-thirds interest in this tract of land, and
obtained the whole of it. The grantor, under a
mistake as to her rights, undertook to convey
an undivided one-third interest, for which she
received rather more than half of its value. It
is true that the language of the deed is very
clear: 'It is conceded by said Eugenia L. Haden,
party of the first part, that said E. H. Burton
has title to an undivided two-thirds interest in
the above-described property. And the said
Eugenia L. Haden hereby disclaims any interest
or claim to the said undivided two-thirds hereby
admitted to be vested in said E. H. Burton.'
That is not the language of the compromise of
a doubtful right; but is the recognition of an
undisputed right which she, acting under a mistake as to her title, was of opinion had already
vested in her grantee, and in which she, therefore, had no interest, and over which she had no
control. It is true that the deed continues: 'But
whatever be the interest of the said Eugenia L.
Haden in and to said tract of land, it is the intent
of this deed to convey the whole of her said interest, be the same one-third or more, to the said
E. H. Burton.' But the deed is to be construed
as a whole; and it is inconceivable that the
grantee, with knowledge as to the condition of
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her title and that she was the owner in fee simple
of the e~tire tract, would have parted with it for
the consideration named in the deed." (Italics
ours).
In the present case it is inconceivable that Stock,
knowing that Meagher had no right to a release or surrender, and knowing that he was under no obligation
to release and of the construction now placed upon the
instrument, would have transferred or conveyed his
rights without consideration. In Burton v. Haden, supra,
the court recognized the rule that a mistake of an
antecedent legal right is ground for relief in equity and
cancelled the instrument.
The cases dealing with the evidential value of
recitals are important read in the light of purposes of
recitals. The recitals in the instrument are attributable
to ~Ieagher, he having prepared the same. He put words
into Stock's mouth, in effect: "I am under duty to give
you this release, therefore, I am giving it."
The Wigmore quotations, supra, come close to what
we have here, namely: a motive mentioned in the terms
of the act. Showing that the condition failed to exist
as a fact, that Stock was not under duty to release to
Meagher, renders the act at least voidable if not void.
Meagher was responsible for creating in Stock the mental attitude shown by the recitals in A-30. The motive
expressed as a condition, proven to be wrong and shown
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to have originated with }.Ieagher, the thing itself, A-30,
is void. ''Thether it be called fraud or rnistake is of little
consequence-the result is the same.
There 'Yas no thought in Stock's mind, and this is
supported by the recitals, that anything of virility was
passing from him to Meagher. Meagher, the scrivener
of the release, by its mere presentation to Stock, said,
in effect, that nothing of virility existed. For Meagher to
turn around now and say, in the face of the recitals
and his letters, that he, Meagher, had a different intention, would be to permit the perpetration of a fraud.
That is true if the law does concern itself with the
motives for making contracts and if "the whole scope
of fraud outside the contract is the creation of false
motives and the removal of true ones" as stated by
Holmes, The Common Law, supra.

In the case of Adamson v. Brockbank, supra, this
court said:
"To insist that respondents conveyed away
a right as valuable as the one herein involved,
without consideration, shocks one's sense of
justice, and the court should scrutinize all the
facts to determine whether the conveyance was
obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or trickery."
The principle apparent _from the record in our case
is parallel with several of the principles announced in
the Brockbank case, including the expression of the court
therein, as follows :
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"In considering the last of the principles
above quoted, it is sufficient to state t~at appellant Brockbank, by virtue of hjs superior knowledge; by his act of taking respondents .to the
courthouse and pointing out the plats which revealed the existing discrepancy; by assuring respondents he would satisfy their mortgagee that
the quitclaim deed was only for the purpose of
clearing up the discrepancy; by obtaining clearances from the mortgagee of respondents' property; and by having a representative of the title
insurance company further assure them of the
necessity and purpose of the deed; all these were
such circumstances as justified respondents in
relying on Brockbank's representations without
making an independent investigation."
Just as in the Brockbank case we have a situation
here where

"* * * we are not concerned with the rights
of bona fide purchasers ; we are only concerned
with the rights between the parties to the transaction."
The letters from Meagher and his daughter, the
release pointing out in its recitals the book and page
in the recorder's office of that portion of the June 4,
1924 lease, later abrogated, no reference made to the
modification of May 21, 1927, the position of Meagher
in the community, his immediate access to the county
records and Stock's presence at Cody, Wyoming, many
miles distant, make a striking parallel to the portions
of the Brockbank case quoted above, and also the further
expression of this court in that case as follows:
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Hln the situation confronting us we have
other circumstances and conditions. We need not
go into these, as the representation here was one
of fact, i.e., that the purpose and effect of the
deed was only to fix the boundary. If appellant,
Alan Brockbank, was falsely intending to obtain
more under the deed, then this was a misrepresentation as to his intentions. This is the case of
a grantee inducing the grantor to execute a deed
which, unbeknown to the grantor because of his
ignorance of such matters, conveyed much more
than the grantor intended it to convey." (Italics
ours).
5.

EXHIBIT A-30 LACKS CONSIDERATION.

Finding of Fact numbered 42 as follows:
"In consideration of the transfer A30 from
Stock to Meagher, Meagher relinquished his right
to require Stock to perform the obligations of
the lessee which Stock was bound to perform
previous to Meagher's acceptance of said traris-.
fer.",
the only finding of consideration. This finding, we
contend, is not supported by, but contrary to, the evi-

IS

dence and law. There was no consideration for the socalled release, A -30.
The court does not point out the obligations of the
lessee which Stock was allegedly bound to perform
previous to Meagher's acceptance of A-30, nor what
Meagher relinquished by way of right against Stock.
It must be borne in mind that the lease, as modified,
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is a unit so far as performance is concerned. Meagher
could not relinquish a portion of performance any Inore
than Stock could effectively relinquish a portion of the
lease. This court has said, in effect, in its former decision, that the consideration for the lease had been earned
long prior to A-30.
If Meagher was in the position of the landlord,
which he was not, he still would have had to contend
with Juhan, the owner of all of the gas mineralleaseho~d
estate, and with Phebus, the owner of one-half of the
oil mineral estate. There was no obligation singled out
for Stock to perform that Meagher could waive or forego by way of consideration. There was no privity
between Meagher and Phebus, or between Meagher and
Juhan. They, and particularly Juhan, had the right to
the enjoyment of their respective mineral estates irrespective of Meagher. Carried to the P-xtreme, the finding
treats the situation as if Stock were the sole lessee and
under obligation to Meagher the landlord in the matter
of performance and as if Meagher l1ad released Stock
of his obligations. None of these things existed nor was
such bargained for.
In a pretrial conference held at Vernal on November 12, 1949, (p. 50, A-58), counsel for Meagher stipulated that there was no cash or money paid for the
document of October 21, 1944. On page 94 of the exhibit
counsel states, in effect, the substance of the above
finding and said in part:
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•·r

an1 not trying to assert at this ti1ne that
there ":ras a violation of those things to do by
Stock, but most any lessee, as long as he is a
lessee, is subjected to obligations. And when he
surrenders and the landlord accepts the surrender he is freed of those obligations, and from
ti1ne im1nen1orial that has been considered sufficient legal consideration to support a surrender
even though no money or other things of value
are involved."

The foregoing might well be true if Stock was the
owner of the entire oil and gas mineral estate. But this
was not the fact. Some argument might be made if there
was an obligation of performance for which Stock could
singly be made accountable, but such is not the case.
The contention is confused with the normal surrender
clause where the surrender is made by the lessee holding the entire mineral estate to a landlord who is entitled to receive the same, resulting in a merger of title.
The idea of consideration, as expressed by counsel and
as reflected in the above finding, is but a play upon words
because there was, in fact, no consideration. The document recites no consideration. It is conceded that no
money or cash was paid for the same and Meagher, in
his letter to Phebus on November 9, 1944, said"/ believe

you know I would not ask for surrender of anybody's
rights without payment, but in this instance actually
no rights exist for anybody through that old .Zease of
1924." (Italics ours).
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Gross crude oil sales from the property arnounted
to more than $672,000.00 from September 18, 1948 up
to and including May 31, 1950 (R. 255). Meagher would
contend that the nebulous theory of consideration, as
outlined above, supports A-30 as a transfer or conveyance of one-half of values immediate and prospective
as so indicated, less royalty. Inadequacy of consideration may be so gross as to shock the conscience and
common sense of all men and may amount both at law
and in equity to proof of fraud. This was the statement
of the Washington court in Sova v. First Nat. Bank
of Ferndale (1943), 138 P. 2d 181, 190, where it is
stated:
"And in 12 Am. Jur. p. 617, section 122,
appears the following text: '* * * Doubtless,
however, the inadequacy may be so flagrant as of
itself to afford a presumption of fraud, as, for
instance, if the contract is, in the language of
Lord Hardwicke, such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept
on the other.' "
In the instant case we go even further. There was
no consideration. There was no bargain for an interest
and nothing intended to be conveyed or transferred.
There was no donative intent so a gift cannot be spelled
out of the transaction. Divorcing from the transaction
reflected by A-30, the construction that Meagher, sheerly
out of . self-interest, would now place upon the same,
the situation resolves itself into the simple equationMeagher represented and Stock believed as shown by
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his signature to the docu1nent that the lease of June 4-,
19~4 \\Tas cancelled by ternlination of production of oil
and gas "in accordance \vi th the terms of the lease,"
and that Stock \\Tas ron'tractually bound under the circumstances to execute the release. Both of these propositions \\Tere untrue. The contractual stipulation found
in the lease of J nne -1, 19:2-1 had been annulled and
abrogated by the modification agree1nent of May 21,
1927 and Stock was not under a contractual duty to
release. The lease of June -1, 1924, as modified by the
agreement of ~lay 21, 1927, was not cancelled by termination of production of oil and gas, or otherwise,
as decided by this court in its decision of Oetober 27,
1947. To make a transfer or conveyance out of the
instrument is as unrealistic as finding numbered 42,
which reaches out into thin air to find a consideration
to support such theory. For convenience we quote the
entire release, Exhibit A-30, omitting the acknowledgment and recording data, as follows:
"RELEASE
Whereas, a certain oil and gas lease dated
the 4th day of June, 1924, given by James Wash
Sheridan and Iva H. Sheridan, his wife, and
Francis Hamilton Sheridan, lessors, to R. C.
Hill, lessee, and covering the following described
land in the County of Uintah, and State of Utah,
to-wit:
Section 15-EV2 of SElJ!; Section 22-E¥2
of NEl!J,; NE14 of SE14; Section 23-NW14 of
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N\tVl!t ; Slf2 of NW1,4 ; Nlf2 of SW:J4 ; SW1;4 of
NEI)!; NW14 of SEl;i, all in Township 5 South,
Range 22 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
was recorded on the 25th day of July, 1924, in
Book 3 of Miscellaneous Records at pages 313318, of the records in the office of the County
Recorder of Uintah County, Utah, and
Whereas the lessee and his assigns agreed
that upon failure to fulfill the terms of the lease,
'The lessee hereby agrees to relinquish, cancel
and surrender the same to the lessors and to
clear the record title of said lands from the lien
or burden of said lease by making, executing,
acknowledging and delivering a proper conveyance or release thereof and causing the same
to be recorded in the office of the County Clerk
and Recorder of the County where the said lands
are situated, without expense to the lessors.'
( P. 317, Book 3, Miscellaneous records) ;
Whereas, Paul Stock derived his interests by
virtue of an assignment of the rights under this
original lease;
Whereas, the said lease and all rights thereto or incidental thereto are now owned by N. J.
Meagher by virtue of cancellation of the lease
by termination of production of oil and gas in
accordance with the terms of the lease;
Now, therefore, know all men by these presents, that Paul Stock does hereby cancel, release,
relinquish and surrender to N. J. Meagher, his
heirs and assigns, all of his right, title and
interest in and to the said oil and) gas lease, and
all of his right, ti~tle and interest in and to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

77
::;aid oil and gas lease in so far as it conveys the
lands above described.
In ,,. . itness '\""hereof, the said Paul Stock has
set his hand this 21st day of October, 1944.
Paul Stock."
By reason of the so-called release n{eagher_ 1s
claiming one-half of the oil rights in property unproductive, so far as the oil mineral estate is concerned,
until September 1948, but which produced, after the
expenditure of substantial risk capital in a locality
previously unproductive of oil, more than $672,000.00
from September 18, 1948 to and including May 31, 1950
and in the potentialities of future earnings indicated by
such a production record. The fact that Meagher paid
nothing for the interest that he claims was transferred
by the foregoing instrument does indeed shock the
conscience of all fair-minded men and is in and of
itself sufficient to compel the intervention of a court
of equity. The lack of consideration is evidence of the
fraud heretofore said to have been perpetrated. In
this connection we again quote from Adamson v. Brockbank, supra, as follows :
"The testimony indicates there was no consideration for the deed. This is at variance with
the stated consideration of $10; however, no
United States revenue stamps appear on the
deed, and this is consistent with no consideration.
16 Am. Jur. p. 456 sets forth the general rule
with respect to the effect of inadequacy or want
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of consideration. The 'text states: '* * :x· I-Io"\\
ever if the inadequacy of consideration is so
glaring as to stamp the transaction with fraud
and to shock the common sense of honesty, a
court of equity will intervene. If the consideration is grossly inadequate, equity in any case
\vill lay hold of slight circumstances of oppression, fraud, or duress, in order to rescind the
conveyance. Inadequacy of consideration tends
to show fraud, where other circumstances point
to misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence,
oppression, abuse of a confidential relationship,
etc. * •X< *'
7

-

Granted that a quitclaim deed given io correct a boundary discrepancy may recite a nominal consideration and yet be legally effective;
however, whe.n, as here, a party claims a valuable
and additional right was released or quitclaimed,
then the adequacy of the consideration becomes
important." (Italics ours).
6.

A-30 SHOULD BE CANCELLED ON THE GROUND
OF MISTAKE.

We take the position that the so-called Stock release
was not effective for any purpose. Assuming, for the
purpose of argument, that the instrument had some
vitality, which, of course, we do not admit, it is obvious
,that the same was executed by Stock under a mistake
as to his preexisting right. Meagher now takes the
position, after the decision of this court, that he was
also mistaken as to the existence of the lease, as modified. He says that, notwithstanding his pr-evious asser-

.

tion of record that the lease had ceased to exist, he can
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say that he was 1nistaken as to the fact and as to the
la,v, ur either, and ~dopt a construction as best serves
his purpose.
In light of all of the circumstances it is clearly
evident that Stock 'vas 1nistaken as to the contractual
obligation to release as 'Yas Meagher, unless, of course,
~Ieagher acted fraudulently. The authorities that follow demonstrate the proposition that the release should
be cancelled 'vhether the mistake of the preexisting right
be one of fact or one of law:

Restatement, Restitution, Section 18:
"A person who has ~ntered into a contract
binding upon him and has paid money to the
other party thereto under an erroneous belief
induced by a mistake of fact that the terms of
the contract required such payment, is entitled
to restitution from the other, except where the
mistake is only as to the time of payment.
Comment a. The rule stated in this Section
applies to situations where the contract is completely effective but where an event or condition
upon 'vhich payment was to be made by the terms
of the contract has not happened or does not
exist. It is applicable, not only where there has
been a failure of performance by the payee, but
also where a condition precedent to payment,
although not part of the payee's performance,
has not occurred. It is applicable also to situations where an initial liabili·ty to pay has terminated and where payment is made because of
a supposed but non-existent breach of contract
by the payor."
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The above section deals with the payn1ent of 1noney.
But section 39 of the Restatement ·ties section 18 in with
the transfer of other things. Under section 18 it can
be argued that Stock was 1nistaken as to the occurrence
of a condition precedent to his duty to perform, i.e.,
the failure to drill for oil. It can also be asserted that
an initial liability had terminated because of the fulfillment of all promises in the amended lease.

Restatement, Restitution, Section 39:
"Except as stated in sections 41 and 42, a
person is entitled to restitution from another
because of n1istake of fact if he has transferred
to ~the other land, chattels, negotiable instruments
or choses in action under such circumstances that,
had he paid money to the other, he would have
been entitled to restitution."
This section would bring the instant case within
the rule of section 18.

Restatement, Restitution, Section 59:
"A person who has conferred a benefit upon
another by mistake is not precluded from maintaining an action for restitution by the fact that
the mistake was due to his lack of care."

Tuttle v. Doty (1918), 168 N.W. 990 (Mich.):·
A mother believed
stolen by her grandson.
out to her daughter a
stock, the daughter to

that stock certificates had been
Because of this belief she made
transfer of her interest in the
have complete title when the
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stock 'vas found or the transfer con1pleted on the company books. The grandson had not stolen the stock.
It appeared that the 1nother had delivered the stock
to her daughter to keep for her, a fact that both the
IUOther and daughter had forgotten. rrhe COUrt held
that but for the 1nistake of the n1other as to the vvhereabouts of the stock the transfer would not have been
made. Rescission 'vas allowed. Here there was no contract, but a gift 'vhich was motivated by a mistake of
fact.

Johnson v. Saum (1904), 98 N.W. 599 (Iowa):
In consideration of defendant's becoming a surety
for him, plaintiff gave defendant a promissory note
secured by a chattel mortgage. Defendant sold the
mortgaged property and paid plaintiff's obligation.
There were further dealings between the parties and
plaintiff came to owe some more money to the defendant.
The defendant presented a bill to plaintiff demanding
$500-which sum included the debt already satisfied.
In settlement of the claim the plaintiff delivered a horse
to the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff wa.s
entitled to restitution of the amount paid twice to the
defendant.

Restatement, Restitution, Section 49, paragraph
(1) :
'~A

person is entitled to
other to whom gratuitously
by a mistake of law he has
things or has surrendered a

restitution from anand induced thereto
given land or other
claim if the 1nistake
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(a) Was caused by fraud or material misrepresentation, or
(b) Was as to the identity or relationship
of the donee or was some other basic mistake, or
(c) Caused the donor to give other or more
than he intended to."

Restatement, Restitution, Section 50:
"If a person has transferred to another his
interest in property in the performance of an
· agreement based upon an assumption that the
transferror's interest was smaller than it was,
the assumption being due to a mistake of law
either shared by both parties or known to the
grantee, he is entitled to restitution upon the return of what he has received, or to restitution of
the excess, or to other relief, as the equities of the
situation may require."
Our situation seems to come within the idea of both
of the above sections.

Renard v. Clink (1892), 51 N.W. 692, (Mich.):
An assignee of a mortgagee had brought action to
foreclose a mortgage, and in the action had received
a deed. The foreclosure action, however, was legally
ineffectual. Thereafter the mortgagor tendered to the
assignee the amount due on the mortgage, but not including the costs of the former suit. The rule of law was that
refusal of a tender without good excuse discharged the
mortgage. Under this rule the mortgagor asserted that
the refusal of the tender extinguished the rights of the
mortgagee's assignee in the mortgaged property. The
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court held that the assignee's mistake as to the legal
effect of the first foreclosure relieved hin1 of the result
of the refusal of tender, although his mistake was based
upon a 1nistake of la\v. It \Vas said that relief is granted
where a Inistake of law is with respect to one's "own
antecedent and existing private legal rights."

Gerdine v. Menage (1889), 43 N.W. 91 (Minn.):
This \Vas an action to set aside foreclosure proceedings. The defendant had attempted to foreclose certain
mortgages and, thinking he had complied with the law,
and that he had become owner of the mortgaged premises, recorded a satisfaction of the mortgages. In this
action the mistake was pleaded and the appellate court
directed that the satisfaction be purged from the records.
Although the mistake was as to the lawfulness of the
prior procedure, the court said:
"Such mistakes are classed with mistakes of
fact, and are frequently relieved from, where the
equity is clear. They are to be distinguished from
mistakes or ignorance of general rules of law,
and from cases where the parties mistake the
legal effect of a contract or transaction they have
made or entered into, of the terms or particulars
of which there is no misunderstanding. A person
may be ignorant or mistaken as to his own antecedent legal rights or interests, while he clearly
understands the scope of the transaction into
which he enters."

Swedesboro Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Gans (1903), 55
Atl. 82 (N.J.Eq.):
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Mortgagor died. The mortgagee, believing that
property descended to the father of a decedent, obtained
a deed from the mortgagor's father, along with a release
of dower by the. decedent's wife. Under statutes of descent and distribution property did not descend to
fathers. But the mortgagee, believing upon the advice
of a scrivener that he had acquired the equity of redemption, cancelled the mortgage. In this action the court
reinstated the mortgage and allowed a foreclosure
against the heirs of the mortgagor, although the mortgage was cancelled because of a mistake of law.
This case contains a review of earlier English authorities allowing cancellation for mistake of law. Any
dicta in the case to the effect that negligence of the
grantor or releasor may prevent relief in equity is
clarified· by Restatement, Section 59, supra.

Peter v. Peter (1931), 175 N.E. 846, 75 A.L.R. 890
(Ill.) :
Wife of deceased failed to have will probated because of a belief that she had acquired good title to the
same property by way of a warranty deed given by her
husband prior to his death. The deed was not valid. The
court in this action held that this mistake as to the validity of the deed was sufficient to allow relief in equity,
and a reopening of probate for the benefit of successors
to the wife-although the mistake was one of law. The
court said (75 A.L.R. 893 et seq.):
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·~counsel

for appellees argue that, though the
\vido\v "Tas Inistaken in believing that the deeds
fron1 her husband Yested the property in her, her
1nistake \Vas one of la\v, and that equity will not
relieve against a n1istake of law. While it has
been stated as a general rule that a 1nistake of law
pure and sin1ple is not adequate ground for relief
in equity, yet, even when the 1nistake is one of
la,v, equity someti1nes intervenes. Moore v. Shook,
27G Ill. -±7, 114 N.E. 592. Courts of equity have
aided Inistaken parties because of the demands of
justice. Private legal rights, interests, duties, or
liabilities are al\vays more or less complex, particularly to the layman. They depend upon conditions of fact as well as rules of law, and a concrete
notion of a private legal right, interest, or liability is not readily separated from the facts on
which it depends. Such mistakes may therefore
be, and frequently are, properly considered as
mistakes of fact. There is no fact relating to
private rights, interests, estates, or liabilities that
does not more or less involve rules of law, as
where A proves that he is the owner of certain
real estate. Such is proved as a fact; yet this fact
rests upon the law relating to the sufficiency of
the conveyance, the competency of the grantor
to convey, and in some instances the form of the
instrument, but A does not the less prove a fact
because that fact involves some relation of law.
To say that because it involves a legal relation
it is not a fact would seem to arise from a confusion of ideas. One may be ignorant or mistaken
as to his own antecedent legal existing rights, interests, duties, or liabilities though he accurately
understands the legal scope of the transaction
into which he enters and its effect upon his rights
and liabilities. There are many well-considered
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decisions in which relief has been awarded
against mistakes pure and simple of this character though not always based on the ground that
equit~ will relieve against a mistake of law."
Following this case there is an Annotation in 75
A.L.R. 896, in which the cases predominantly support the
view that mistakes of law of this type may be the
ground for relief in equity.

Freeman v. Curtis (1862), 51 Me. 140:
The defendant told the plaintiffs that there was
some question concerning the distribution of decedent's
property-whether it would go to the cousins or to plaintiffs, an uncle and aunt. The rule of descent was that
the property would go to uncle and aunt. The defendant
asserted that he intended to contest a will; and showed
to the plaintiffs deeds of release from the cousins of
decedent. The defendant then promised to give to plaintiff's 1/12 of all the property recovered from the estate
in consideration of the plaintiffs deeding to him all their
interest in the estate. In this action the defendant was
ordered to convey to the plaintiffs all he had received.
The court said :
"And whenever money can be recovered back
at law, on the ground that it has been paid by
mistake, other propery may be recovered back at
law, or in equity."
The court recognized the rule that relief may sometimes
be grounded on a mistake of law, and said:
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"If the defend ant was as ,ignorant as the
plaintiffs, the mistake was mutual. If he was not
ignorant, then he knolvingly took advantage of
their ignorance, and obtained the deeds fraudulently.'' (Italics ours).
Goff v. Gott (1858), 5 Sneed 562, 37 Tenn. 294:
Defendant had been defrauded of a horse by a third
person who had in turn sold the horse to plaintiff, a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice. When defendant learned of the fraud he demanded the return of
the horse by plaintiff who, thinking that the defendant
had a right to it, gave it up. In an action of detinue the
plaintiff was allowed to recover. The court discounted
the defenses of (1) gift; and (2) mistake of law. Quoting
from Story, Eq. Jur. Vol. I, Section 122, the court said:
" 'Where the party acts upon the misapprehension, that he has no title at all in the property,
it seems to involve, in some measure, a mistake
of fact, that is, of the fact of ownership, arising
from a mistake of law.'"
Barnett v. Kunkle, 256 Fed. 644 (8th C.C.A. 1919):
Barnett conveyed an entire parcel by warranty deed,
believing (1) that the deed was only for ¥2 (he couldn't
read English), and (2) that he owned only ¥2 of the
property. His belief as to his ownership was based upon
a mistake as to the devolution of property by inheritance
in Oklahoma. The court held he was entitled to relief
from the instrument on either of three grounds: (1) The
deed was given under a material mistake as to the extent
of the grantor's interest in the land; or (2) The deed
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was given under a mistake of Barnett' s wh"1ch was " a1"ded
and confirmed by the statement of l\1oore that Barnett
owned only a ¥2 interest." or (3) Both parties believed
Barnett only owned a :1f2 interest, and that was all intended to be conveyed. Thus the deed did not express the
intent of the parties.

Bronson v. Leibold (1913), 87 Atl. 979 (Conn.):
Defendant was purchasing real estate under a conditional sales contract from the plaintiff. He fell in
arrears in his payments and, thinking that his rights had
been forfeited because of his defaults, he executed a
quitclaim deed to the plaintiff vendor. He later consulted an attorney and learned that foreclosure was
necessary in such a contract, and that his rights had
not been forfeited. Thereafter he tendered the amount
due under the contract and demanded a deed. The plaintiff refused. The vendor later brought this action for
rent and defendant counterclaimed for cancellation of
the quitclaim deed and for a reconveyance of the property to him. The pla1ntiff pleaded that the mistake was
not (1) material; (2) mutual, or (3) one of fact-but of
law. Said the court:
"The defendant believed that he had lost his
rights in this property, and as a consequence that
the plaintiff would eject him. He did not know he
had the right to tender the amount of his debt
and demand a deed which the plaintiff must give.
The plaintiff and his attorneys entertained a
similar belief that the defendant had forfeited
his rights under the contract, and they confirmed
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the defendant in this belief. No fraud was practiced and none was necessary to be alleged or
proved to secure the relief sought. The mutual
1nistake 'vas as to the legal rights of the defendant arising out of the contract.
Though this were held to be purely a mistake of -law, the defendant would not, under the
circumstances of the case, be denied relief upon
that ground."
In the case last cited both parties did what they
thought they were obligated to do. As in the case at bar,
if there was a mistake it was "confirmed" by the other
party. The Meagher letters show that.
In Love et al. v. Phillips et al. (1922), 60 Utah 329,
208 P. 882, it was held that equity had jurisdiction to
grant relief from the consequences of mistake as to antecedent existing legal rights. The trial court was of the
opinion that the fact that the plaintiffs were mistaken
as to the legal effect of certain deeds did not entitle them

to any relief. This was on the theory, as the trial court
conceived it, that a mistake must be a mutual mistake
or the acts induced by fraud on the part of the party
against whom relief is sought. This court on the appeal
of the case held otherwise, stating :
"We are thoroughly convinced that the plaintiffs executed the quitclaim deeds in 1907 under
a misapprehension or mistake as to their legal
rights in the property of their father's estate.
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The question for determination is: Has a
court of equity, by reason of s~ch facts as ap~ear
in this record, power or authority to grant rehef?
We are of opinion that it has, and, further, that
it is the duty of such court to grant the parties
relief. There was no consideration for the execution of any of the quitclaim deeds except the release or conveyance by the other heirs to the
parties executing ~uch quitclaim deeds of their
interest in the lands belonging to the father's
estate. This is therefore a case in which a court
can, without injury to others, relieve the parties
from their mistake and therefore do justice to all
concerned." (Italics ours).
This court quoted with approval from 2 Pomeroy
Eq. Jur. (3d Ed.), Section 849 as follows:
" 'I therefore venture to formulate the following general rule as being eminently just and
based on principle, and furnishing a simple criterion defining the extent of the jurisdiction.
The number of decisions which support it, and
which it explains, is very great. Wherever a person is ignorant or mistaken with respect to his
own antecedent and existing private legal rights,
interests, estates, duties, liabilities, or other relation, either of property or contract or personal
status, and enters into some transaction the legal
scope and operation of which he correctly apprehends and understands, for the purpose of affecting such assumed rights, interests, or relations, or of carrying out such assumed duties or
liabilities, equity will grant its relief, defensive
or affirmative, treating the mistake as analogous
to, if not identical with, a 1nistake of fact.'"
(Italics ours).
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On the related subject of fraud, related by the circumstances of the transaction as in the case at bar, the
court said:
If the parties had voltmtarily entered into
an agree1nent, uninfluenced by the father's deeds,
for a division of the property left by the father,
then a different question would be presented~
Clearly such \Vas not the intent of any of the parties in Inaking or receiving the quitclaim deeds.
The plaintiffs, believing that their rights were
fixed by the deeds of the parents, were to that
extent at least mistaken as to their legal rights-.
If the defendants were advised. and knew that
the deeds of the parents were invalid and conveyed no title and at the same time knew or had
reason to believe that the plaintiffs were ignorant
of such fact, then failure on the part of defendants to disclose and make known the rights of
plaintiffs would be actual fraud."
H

In Adamson v. Brockbank, supra, this court again
recognized the principle laid down in the Love case that
a court of equity can set aside a deed where there has
been mutual mistake as to the interest of the grantor in
the property conveyed, whether it be a mistake of fact
or law. At pretrial, page 32, Exhibit A-58, Meagher
readily conceded that in the "early phases" of this trial
he asserted that the oil and gas lease was of no force
and effect, having been abandoned. He conceded that he
"was wrong on that point." The so-called release was
obtained four days after the commencement of the action,
by which document Stock also said that the lease had
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been cancelled, but assigned as the reason "termination
of production of oil and gas in accordance with the tern1s
of the lease." Meagher was urging his contention of
abandonment and termination of the lease, not only in
the "early phases" of the case commencing in October
1944 but also until after the decision of this court in
October 1947 when he filed a petition for rehearing,
which was not overruled and denied until the following
March.
While we assert that self-interest prompted the
change of heart on the part of Meagher after he was
ruled out by the decision of this court,. nevertheless, it is
obvious that both Meagher and Stock were mistaken
at the time of the release as to the existence and vitality
of the June 4, 1924 lease and the modification agreement
of May 21, 1927. Whether the mistake be one of fact
or one of law is of no consequence as equity will afford
relief under both conditions under the circumstances of
this case. Going back to the Brockbank case, and in this
connection, the court said :
"The trial court could have resolved this
question against the appellants on one of two
grounds : Firstly, if the court found that appellant, Brockbank, had no knowledge of the existence of the ditch and none of the parties to the
deed had any intention of dealing with the rights
to the .ditch, then it would have been a case of
mutual mistake as to the extent of the property
conveyed. A court of equity can set aside a deed
where there has been mutual mistake as to the
interest of the grantor in the property conveyed,
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\\¥hether it be a 1nistake of faet or hnv-. (See 2G
C.J.S., Deeds, ~ection 55, page 272). As said in
16 Am. J ur. 466 : 'in other words, if a deed does
not expre~s the agree1nent of the parties to it,
if there is such an agree1nent, it is imn1aterial
\\¥hether a n1istake therein 1nade is one of law or
fact.' "
In Finding of Fact nun1bered 36? referring to the
document . A. -30, the court finds ~~nor did any defendant
take, or refrain from taking, any action due to any n1isconception of fact or of law." In Conclusion of Law
numbered 14 the court concludes that the document A-30
"is sufficient to transfer to Meagher all of the sai(d
lessee's rights then owned by Stock," and in Conclusion
of Law numbered 16 that "Neither Stock nor any other
defendant is entitled to rescind the transfer from Stock
to Meagher, document A-30, on any basis, * * *." We
have demonstrated the incorrectness of the specific findings and conclusions.
Either Meagher defrauded Stock or there was a
n1utual mistake of fact in one or more particulars, viz.,
(a) that termination of production of oil and gas cancelled the lease, (b) that Stock was under contractual
obligation to relinquish, (c) that Stock derived his interest by virtue of an assignment of the rights under the
lease of June 4, 1924, and (d) that the modification agreeInent of May 21, 1927 was not controlling (it was not
mentioned or referred to in the release) ; or there was
a mistake of law as to Stock's antecedent legal rights.
There being a total lack of consideration and Meagher
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not having, by the record, changed his position or given
up anything to Stock by reason of A-30, there was nothing that Stock could do by way of tender back. Therefore, every element necessary for rescission and cancellation of the instrument of October 21, 1944 exists, all
as prayed for by the counterclaim of Stock.
The defenses of fraud, mistake, lack of consideration, laches and estoppel, clearly shown by the record,
are properly urged, at the same time, by Juhan and
Phebus, as well as Stock, and those claiming by, through
or under them. The negative findings and conclusions
should be rejected and, as pointed out above, the Stock
instrument, A-30, should be cancelled and annulled of
record, the proper findings and conclusions being directed for that purpose.
Aside from the affirmative defenses so indicated,
and the Stock counterclaim, Meagher, in order to prevail,
must persuade this court that document A-30 is in and
of itself a transfer, assignment or conveyance, the theory
upon which the findings are drawn, or a surrender, the
theory upon which the trial court's fifty-five page memorandum decision was based; therefore, the next point.
7.

A-30 IS ABORTIVE AS A SURRENDER OR RELINQUISHMENT.

The so-called Stock release purports to "cancel, release, relinquish and surrender to N. J. Meagher, his
heirs and assigns, all of his (Stock's) right, title and interest in and to the said oil and gas lease, and all of his
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right, title and interest in and to the said oil and gas
lease in so far as it conyeys the lands above described."
Finding of Fact nun1bered 35 finds that by the document . A. -30 Stock tra-nsferred to l\Jeagher an undivided
one-half interest in the lessee's right with respect to
oil in the -±-±0 acre parcel. The ":ord "transferred" is
also found in Findings 39, 40 and 42. In Finding of Fact
numbered 43 it is stated, n1ore as a conclusion, that it
is not necessary to determine "whether document A-30
constituted an assignment or surrender of Stock's interests in the lessee's rights, since in either event, as between Stock and Meagher, it was a transfer to Meagher
of all interest in the lessee's rights owned by Stock."
Conclusion of Law numbered 14 is that the granting
clause contained in document A-30 is· sufficient to transfer to Meagher all of the lessee's rights then owned by
Stock.
The trial court's extended memorandum decision,
with some inconsistencies, divided the lease in half so
far as oil is concerned, excepting only so-called landowners royalties and gave the Stock portion, as so divided, to Meagher. The court premised its decision upon
a "surrender" effective as against even one-half of the
overriding royalty, originally 6%, in favor of Ashley
Valley Oil Company. Note particularly R. 173.
When objections were urged that Meagher's proposed findings, later adopted, were inconsistent with the
memorandum decision, the inconsistency was conceded
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by counsel (R. 327, 331). The whole matter was thereafter resolved, at least to the trial court's satisfaction,
by its supplemental decision to the effect that it makes
no difference whether A-30 is a "surrender" or a "conveyance," stating :
"The question, as the Court conceived it and
now conceives it, is as to whether, under any
theory, A-30 was sufficient to take from Stock
and place in Meagher what rights Stock then had
under A-1 - A-5. The Court felt, and now feels,
that it has that effect, whether it is a conveyance
or is merely a surrender. The Findings of Fact,
paragraphs 35, 39, 40, 42, at least, describe it as
a 'transfer' of Stock's interest to Meagher. That
expression is sufficiently specific in the Court's
judgment without designating whether such transfer resulted from a conveyance or a surrender."
(R. 197-198) ..
While we are convinced that this court will readily
discern the distinction and marked difference between
"surrender," as that term is contractually used in the
controlling documents, and "transfer," as the term is
used in the findings and conclusions, we, nevertheless,
feel it important to analyze the document A-30 from both
viewpoints, if only to more clearly point out, if possible,
the error upon which the trial court predicates the taking from Stock and placing in Meagher the rights that
Stock had under A-1 - A-5 "under any theory," which
is practically tantamount to saying "no matter upon what
theory."
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vV·e have atte1npted to epitomize the lllOdification
agreeruent of ~Iay :21, 19:27, Exhibit A-5, in what is
denominated as . :\.ppendix H.._\." attached to this brief,
w·ith en1phasis upon paragraphs 20 and 28 thereof, which
give the lessee a lin1ited right of surrender. By referring to the specific paragraphs and to the exhibit itself,
.A. -5, it will be noted that a surrender can only be made
after the Sundance forrnation has b~en pierced, as provided by paragraph 4 of the agreement, and then only to
the whole leasehold interest, unless the lessee desires to
surrender the ·zrhole oil mineral leasehold estate, retaining the gas rights. He can thereafter surrender . the
u;hole of the gas mineral leasehold estate.

The consent of the royalty owners holding 111;2%
is attached to the modification agreement, A-5. By stipulation (R. 256) it was agreed that Lucius A. Dick and
J. N. Wyman by separate documents consented to and
ratified each and all of the terms and provisions of Exhibit A-5, accounting for all of the outstanding royalty
interests at the date thereof. Omitting signatures, including that of N. J. Meagher, the consent is as follows:
"CONSENT OF ROYALTY OWNERS
For a good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof from the parties to the above agreement is hereby acknowledged, we the undersigned
ow:n~rs of royalties on production frorn the lands
thH' subject of the foregoing agreement, do hereby approve of and consent to said agreement and
all of the terrns thereof.
Dated June ________________ , 1927."
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At this point it should be noted from the decision
in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., supra, that the lessee had
complied with the specific provisions of the lease, the
"consideration" for the right to the continuing interest
in the oil and gas mineral estates, and that the "Sundance
formation" was penetrated by operations under the lease
with no condition arising subsequent to that time that
called for further exploration for oil. Furthermore, as
pointed out in the former opinion, gas in commercial
quantities had be~n discovered upon the land at the time
of the execution of Exhibit A-5.
We again invite attention, to the fact that the quoted
portion of the R. C. Hill lease of June 4, 1924, as found
in the second "whereas" clause of the release, A-30, the
same language with but one minor exception, commencing about the middle of the fifth line from the end of
paragraph numbered 21 of the June 4, 1924 lease, A-1, is
not found in A-5, the same having been superseded and
replaced by paragraphs numbered 2 to 29 thereof, both
inclusive.
(a) THE PURPORTED SURRENDER IS NOT TO ALL OF THE OIL
MINERAL ESTATE AS REQUIRED BY A-5.

Briefly stated the lessee had the privilege under A-5
of surrendering, after piercing the Sundance formation,
(a) the entire oil and gas mineral estate and other matters incident to the lease, or (b) the entire oil mineral
estate and (c) after having pierced the Sundance formation and having surrendered the whole oil mineral estate
to surrender the whole gas mineral estate.
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In the former decision of this court, Meagher v.
Uintah Gas Co., supra, speaking of the modification
agreement, it was said :
~·\r e

are called upon to interpret a contract.
That contract bears the name of an 'oil and gas
lease.' However, such nomenclature should not
induce us consciously or unconsciously to unduly
restrict its interpretation within pre-conceived
classification limits."
The parties having contracted on the subject of
surrender, the surrender must be in accordance with
the contractual stipulation~. There is ample authority
to that effect.
In 2 Summers on Oil and Gas (Perm. Ed.), Section
336, page 209, the author states :
"The manner in which a lessee may exercise
the power to surrender depends upon the provisions of the lease. Where a lease expressly provides for the manner in which surrender is to be
made by the lessee, the surrender cannot be made
in any other manner, without the consent of the
lessor."
To the same effect are: Benson v. Nyman (1932),
16 P. 2d 963 (Kan.); McKee v. Grimm et al. (1925), 238
P. 835 (Okl.); Cohn v. Clark (1915), 150 P. 467 (Okl.);
Lamar v. Farmer (1915), 109 N.E. 791 (Ind.); McKee
v. Grimm (1916), 157 P. 308 (Okl.); Roberts v. Be:ttman
(1898), 30 S.E. 95 (W.Va.); Ardizzonne et al. v. Archer ·
(1916), 160 P. 446 (Okl.); White v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1932), 13 P. 2d 186 (Okl.); and
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Ward et ux. v. Tripple State Natural Gas Co. (1909),
115 S.W. 819 (Ky.). In the last case the court said:
''There must be a surrender in fact, a giving
up of the premises for every purpose for which
they were used under the lease. The lessor and
the lessee must, after the surrender, occupy towards the leased premises the same relation they
did before the lease was entered into. Richardso_n
v. Chenault, 31 S.W. 143, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 372;
Ormsby Coal Company v. Bestwick, 129 Pa. 592,
18 A tl. 538."
These cases hold that the Stock instrument did
not have the effect of terminating the lease. The lease
provided the manner in which surrender might be made.
The instrument executed by Stock was just one of the
steps necessary to be performed before the lessee could
be relieved of his obligations under the lease. The lease
itself as modified provides that the "surrender shall not
become effective until the Lessee shall have delivered"
all necessary instruments of transfer. A partial release
or surrender, by the very terms of the contract,-- could
not be made.
If it can be said that surrender may be made other
than as provided in the lease if there is a consent to such
arrangement, then it would follow that a surrender not
according to the provisions of the lease cannot he unilateral. The consent of the lessor must be shown. The
only act of Meagher, in this case, upon receiving the
instrument is the recording of it. This does not show
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

101
consent "Then his conduct is examined in the light of the
surrender provisions of the lease. The letters explain
his conduct and 'vould indicate that he was proceeding
to obtain all necessary instru1nents of transfer-which he
failed to do. There is nothing to shovv that he bargained
away any right to enforce covenants and conditions
against the lessees. If this were an action for rent or
to force the lessees to pay taxes on the property, it is
doubtful that Stock would be relieved because of the
execution of the instrument in question.
There was no surrender under the surrender provision of the lease because the purported surrender was
not in accordance with its terms and there was no agreement to accept a surrender from one of the co-lessees in a
manner othe.r than that provided in t;he lease .
. (b) THE PURPORTED SURRENDER LACKS CONSIDERATION

The trial court, in its memorandum decision, apparently takes the position that the holder of the reversion could bargain with one of the lessees or subassignees to modify the terms of the lease and thus bargain away the right to insist upon the execution of all
necessary instruments to give the rights of exclusive
possession and control. But there is no evidence of any
bargain in the record. In Restatement, Contracts,
Section 75, it is said that nothing is ever consideration,
either sufficient or insufficient, unless it is bargained for
by the promisor as exchange for his promise. Holmes,
The Common Law, page 293, states:
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"It is said that consideration must not be
confounded with motive. It is true that it must
not be confounded with what may be the prevailing or chief motive in actual fact. A man may
promise to paint a picture for five hundred dollars, while his chief motive may be his desire for
fame. A consideration may be given and accepted,
in fact, solely for the purpose of making a promise binding. But, nevertheless, it is the essence
of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the move or
inducement of the promise. Conversely, the
promise must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the
consideration. The root of the whole matter is the
relation of reciprocal conventional inducement,
each for the other, between consideration and
promise."
In 1 Co·rbin on Contracts, Section 132, page 408, the
writer says :
"Of course, the surrender of a right, or the
extinguishment of any other beneficial legal relation, is a sufficient consideration when bargained for by the promisor." (Italics ours).
In Smith v. Brown (1917), 50 Utah 27, 165 P. 468,
it is said:
"As a matter of law, therefore, he could not
impose new conditions upon the defendant. It is
elementary that where a party is already bound
to do a particular thing, but refuses to do it until
the adverse party enters into a new promise without any additional independent consideration, the
latter promise is not binding, since it is without
consideration."
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The expressions in the Bro\Yn case are but another
way of stating the doctrine of Foakes v. Beer, 9 App.
Cas. 605 (Eng.), decided by the Houae of Lords in 1884,
a leading case on the proposition that payment by the
debtor of a sun1 less than the whole amount of the debt
will not extinguish the debt, there being no consideration other than the performance of a portion of a preexisting duty. The Stock instrument fell far short of
what Stock was required to do, if he elected to surrender
under the terms of A-5. Furthermore, there was no
bargain or new consideration for Stock to do less than he
was contractually required to do, leaving Meagher in a
position to still look to Stock for perforinance, assuming,
only for the purpose of argument and not conceding
such to be the fact, Meagher to be the reversioner. What
has been said about the case of Adamson v. Brockbank,
supra, is equally applicable here.
(c) STOCK DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO SURRENDER A PORTION
OF THE OIL MINERAL LEASEHOLD ESTATE, EVEN IF THAT
WAS HIS INTENTION.

The general rule relating to who may surrender is
found in most standard texts on real property. In 4

Tiffany on Real Property (3rd Ed.), Section 960, page
17, it is said :
"In order that a surrender may be effected
the estate surrendered must be no greater in
quantum than the estate of the surrenderee, since
otherwise it can't merge therein. And furthermore
it must immediately precede the latter estate as
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regards the right of possession, with no vested
estate intervening. Consequently, if A leases to
B for years and B leases to C, the subtenant C
cannot surrender to A, and if p·roperty is devised
to A for life, with remainder to B for life, with
remainder to C in fee, A cannot, though B can,
surrender to C. * * *"
And it is said in W oodfall' s Law of Landlord and
Tenant (19th Ed.), page 347:
"In order to make a good surrender of lands
by deed, and to make them pass by such surrender, these things are requisite :-1. That the
surrenderor be a person able to surrender, and
that he have an estate in possession of the thing
surrendered at the time of the surrender made.
2. That the surrender be to him who has the next
immediate estate in remainder or reversion, and
that there be no intervening estate coming between. 3. That there be a privity of estafe between
the surrenderor and the surrenderee. * * *"
The point that we 1nake here is that the Ashley Valley Oil Company-Utah Oil Refining Company modification agreement of June 9, 1927, Exhibit A-6, is in reality
a sublease and that between the estate of Stock, an
assignee of Utah Oil Refining Company, Exhibit A-11,
and Meagher there is an intervening estate, namely:
that of Ashley Valley Oil Company.
In 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Section 314,
it is said:
·"The distinction between an assignment of a
lease and the subletting of the premises lies in the
quantity of interest that passes by the transfer,
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and not upon the extent of the pre1nises involved.
Pri1narily, the test is ""hether, by the transaction,
the lessee conveys his entire ter1n or retains a
reversionary interest, ho,vever small."
This problen1 is also treated in an Annotation 1n
82 . .\.L.R. 1273. There the annotator refers to Sunburst
Oil d!; Ref. Co. v. Callender (1929), 274 P. 834 (Mont.),
for the proposition that:

"* * * an assignment of a lease signifies a
parting with the whole tern1, which includes not
only the whole of the unexpired term, but also
the whole estate of the assignor~-all his interes!t
in the lease. Anything short of this is not an
assignment, but a sublease; also McNamer Realty
Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co. (1926), 76 Mont.
332, 247 Pac. 166, defining an assignment to he
a transfer of title or interest by writing as of a
lease, bond, note, or bill of exchange, carrying
the whole interest of the assignor. An assignment of the lease signifies a parting with the
whole term; whereas no matter by what name
it is called, if, by an instrument in writing, a
lessee grants an interest less than his own, retaining for himself a reversion, it is a sub-lease, and
not an assignment of his lease."
The Montana Court in Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Callender and McNamer Realty Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Gas Co., supra, took the view that reservation of an overriding royalty interest in the original lessee makes the
subordinate grant a sublease instead of an assignment.
In Exhibit A-6 by paragraph numbered 7, there is
reserved a royalty of 6% of the value of all oil and gas
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produced from the 440 acre tract. This override is in
addition to the royalties required to be paid by paragraphs 11 and 12 of the modification agreement, S-mithAshley Valley Oil Company of May 21, 1927, referred
to as Exhibit "A" in A-6. This is specifically provided
for by paragraphs 6 and 7 of A-6.
Paragraph 10 of A-6 requires Utah Oil, in the event
of its election to relinquish or surrender, to give Ashley
Valley "reasonable notice" of such intention in order that
Ashley Valley may have an opportunity of saving to itself the rights which Utah Oil is desirous of relinquishing. This is in the nature of an option so far as Ashley
Valley is concerned.
Paragraph 11 of A-6 makes the terms, proVIsions
and conditions thereof binding upon the respective successors and assigns of the parties. Stock is one of the
assignees of Utah Oil, Exhibit A-11, by the terms of
which (paragraph numbered 1) he agreed to save Utah
Oil harmless in language :

"* * * to keep and perform any and all of the
terms and/or covenants of any of said agreements, as to the above described lands; second
parties, (Stock and Phebus) however, as to the
lands last above described (440 acres), to have
the right to avail themselves of any right or
privilege which said Utah Oil Refining Company
could or might have availed itself of if this assignment had not been made."
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And in paragraph nu1nbered -± of A-ll Stock and
Phebus expressly covenanted and agreed to fulfill and
perform all of the covenants and agreements contained
in the Ashley-Utah Oil modification agree1nent, A-6,
which lTtah Oil would be required to perform if the
assignment were not 1nade, and accepted the assignment
subject to all of the terms, conditions and obligations
thereof. Exhibit A-ll was recorded May 13, 1929 in the
office of the County Recorder, Uintah County, Utah,
which recording charges Meagher with notice of the intervening estate of Ashley Valley Oil Co1npany and its
right to protect its override in the event of an attempted
surrender.
The reservation of the override and the option in
favor of Ashley Valley to reacquire the lease rights
make Stock a sublessee and a surrender by him, without
previous notice to Ashley Valley, an impossibility. There
is nothing in the record to show compliance with the legal
and contractual rights in favor of Ashley Valley. Stock
did not have, under the circumstances, the power to
surrender.
The trial court's fifty-five page memorandum decision ignores the record and the contractual commitments
with respect to surrender and would permit Stock to
wipe out the intervening estate in favor of Ashley Valley by dealing direct with Meagher. The expressions of
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ing to intervening estates, and to the express commitments of the parties themselves, must have motivated
counsel in submitting findings resulting in the decree,
from which this appeal is taken, on the theory that A-30
was a transfer rather than a surrender-a position not
taken by the trial court.
The Ashley Valley-Utah Oil instrument requires
that the lessor could not be revested with full ownership
without giving to Ashley Valley the first right to exercise its option to take up the interest of Utah Oil. This
is the way Ashley Valley contracted to save its override,
which royalty was dependent upon the continued existence of the lease. The lower court recognized this, but
held it to be a mere personal covenant not binding upon
Meagher, even though the instrument was recorded.
Yet the right of Ashley Valley cannot be disregarded.
In

1

Corbin on Contracts, Section 272, it is said:

"But as against a third person who is not an
innocent purchaser for value, the option holder
should have exactly the same rights and remedies
as has any other person who has a contract to buy
the land; the existence of the 'option'-the privilege to perform or not to perform . the conditions-should make no difference. This is supported by the greater number of decisions. The
reason is not that the option holder has an 'interest' in the land, but because he has contract
rights that ought to be respected by third persons. It is as a result of this and not as a reason
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for it, that \Ye Inay properly say that the option
contrart has ereated an equitable interest in the
land." (Italics ours).
:Jieagher is seeking equitable relief in his action
to quiet title and should not be allowed an equitable
decree based upon his O\vn violation of the rights of a
third person.
1 Corbin on Contracts,

page 910 states:

HI£ the option contract is properly recorded,
the recording statutes make such record constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers, so that
the rights of the option holder are superior to
those of such a purchaser even though he paid
value and did not know of the option."
In the present case Meagher neither paid value,
nor did he take the Stock instrument without notice of
the rights of Ashley Valley.
We again refer to the position taken by the trial
court in its supplemental memorandum decision, wherein it is stated, in effect, that A-30 was sufficient to take
from Stock and place in Meagher what rights Stock then
had under A-1 - A-5, whether "it is a conveyance or is
merely a surrender," and that the word transfer "is
sufficiently specific in the Court's judgment without
designating whether such transfer resulted from a conveyance or a surrender." The solemnity of contract
cannot be so abruptly brushed aside.
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(d) MEAGHER IS NOT A REVERSiONER OF THE OIL OR GAS
MINERAL ESTATE.

The trial court's memorandum was erroneously
premised, we believe, upon the proposition that Meagher
stood in the shoes of M. P. Smith as being the one enti tied to receive a surrender. It will be noted that in
paragraphs 20 and 28 of the modification agreement,
Exhibit A-5, repeated reference is made to "M. P. Smith
or to said Smith's nominees," and that the surrender
should not become effective until the lessee shall have
delivered "to said M. P. Smith or his order properly
executed all necessary instruments of transfer and do all
necessary things in order to fully vest said Smith or his
nominees" with all of the rights and privileges so surrendered.
In the chain of title passing to 'Meagher, and which
we concede to be surface rights excluding the mineral
estate, and which surface rights are in turn encumbered
by the leasehold as it affects the use of the surface, there
appears the two quitclaims, Exhibits A-7 and A-8. A-7
is of a four-fifths interest to Meagher and A-8 is of a
one-fifth interest to Alexander. Both documents are
dated December 19, 1927 and are virtually identical, except as to the percentage of interest and the names of
the grantees. We will treat them as one with emphasis
upon A-7. We briefly summarize the same as follows:
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1. The grantors ( S1nith and 'Yife) for the sum of
$1.00 "and the covenants, agreen1ents, stipulations and
conditions hereinafter set forth to be duly paid, kept
and perfor1ned" by ~Ieagher, his heirs, personal representatives and assigns, and for other good and valuable
consideration "do, subject however to the exceptions,
reservations and conditions hereinafter contained" quitclaim the entire 480 acres.

2. The grantors expressly save, except and reserve
from and out of the grant the oil, gas and casing head
gas in said lands contained by whomsoever thereafter
produced therefrom by virtue of the agreements thereafter in the instrument described, to which agreements
the grant is expressly made subject.
3. The instruments except from the grant, by specific reference, the June 4, 1924 oil and gas lease, the
various royalty assignments totaling 12¥2% and the
modification agreement of May 21, 1927, all separately
set forth and referred to in subparagraphs designa:ted
(a) to (i), both inclusive.

4.

~1eagher,

Exhibit A-7, and Alexander, Exhibit

A-8, entered into covenants or warranties with Smith
and his assigns of quiet or peaceable possession and enjoyment of the estates created by the several excepted
documents, in language, using A-7 as the example, as
follows:
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"And I, the undersigned, said N. J. Meagher,
grantee herein, in consideration of the above and.
of the execution and delivery hereof by said M. P.
Smith and EHen M. Smith, and for other good
and valuable considerations, do hereby, for myself, my heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, assume and agree to perform and/or pay
Four-fifths of all the joint and/ or several obligations of said M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith
by them and/or either of the (m), undertaking
and/ or for which they are and/ or each of them is
legally liable, under and by virtue of every and all
the instru1nents hereinabove in subparagraphs
' ( a ) ', ' (b ) ', ' (c) ', ' (d) ', ' ( e ) ', ' ( f) ', ' (g) ', ' (h) ' and
' (i)' described, and covenant and agree with said
M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith and with each of
them,- to save, keep and hold them and each of
them, their respective heirs, executors, and administrators and their joint and several assigns
harmless from, and to indemnify them and each
of them for, four-fifths of any and all loss and/ or
damage by reason of every and all default in the
performance of said joint and/or several obligations of said M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith
and/or any thereof."
The date of the death of M. P. Smith is not in the
record but his widow, Ellen M. Smith, and others conveyed whatever interest they or their ancestor might
have had in the property to Clyde S. Johnson, Exhibit
A-60. Clyde S. Johnson in turn conveyed to Edward F.
Richards, Exhibit A-61. The granting clause after the
decription of the entire 480 acres contained the follow-

mg:
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"Together \Yi th all and singular the teneInents, hereditainents and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any\vise appertaining, the
reversion and reYersions,. re1nainder and renlainders, rents, issues and profits thereof, and
all estate, right, title and interest in and to the
said property, as \vell in law as in equity, of the
said grantors, * * * ."
Not only did the trial court consider Meagher to be
the reversioner so as to receive the purported surrender
from Stock, but the last paragraph of Finding of F·act
nu1nbered 22, the last paragraph of Finding of Fact
numbered 23, the last sentence of Finding of Fact numbered 27, paragraph numbered 3 of paragraph A of the
Conclusions of Law, paragraph numbered 11 thereof and
paragraph numbered 1 of the Judgment and Decree are
all on the theory that Meagher was and is the reversioner
-none supported by the record and all contrary to law.
It having been held and it being the law of the case
that the lease, as modified, is in existence and not cancelled or abandoned, the technical question of reversion
seems to us to be moot.
This court, in its former opinion, has held the lease,
as modified, to be in full force and effect, and that there
has been no violation on the part of tlie lessee of any
provision of the lease, upon which termination of the
lease might be founded nor has any notice of termination
been given by the lessors in an effort to accomplish such
a ter1nina tion of the lease in accordance with its terms.
Furthermore, the idea of reversion in favor of Meagher
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applying to the North Forty, as well as to the 440 acres,
is prompted by self-interest after the decision of this
court in 1947. And still further the lease of June 4, 1924,
with its terms, provisions, covenants, agreements, stipulations and conditions, whether of forfe~ture, surrender
or otherwise, was excluded from Smith's grants to
Meagher and Alexander, A-7 and A-8. Meagher, by his
consent to the modification agreement, A-5, approved of
and consented to all of the terms thereof, which consent
and approval estops him to say that the lands the subject of this agreement mean anything less than the 480
acres specifically described therein, which includes the
North Forty.
There has been no reversion to any part of the 480
acre tract nor does Meagher stand in the shoes of Smith
by any possible construction of being his nomine·e so as
to receive a surrender no matter how imperfectly made.
The North Forty is included in the modification so far
as Meagher and those claiming or to claim under hin1
are concerned. Ashley Valley, in any event, perfected
its title by the Watson deed of October 30, 1930, Exhibit A-16, Watson acting as trustee, successor to R. C.
Hill, and no question being raised as to his power to
convey, page 8, Exhibit A-58.
Meagher's letters to Stock and Phebus, already
referred to, his letter to Juhan, Exhibit A-34, the letter
from Katherine Meagher Ivers to the judge of the court
(R. 12), the recitals in the so-called Stock release, A-30,
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with nieagher's kno"\vledge, as indicated, that the oil and
gas mineral estates had been separated and were separately held, the provision of A-5, to which Meagher
committed hin1self, rnaking the 480 acres "the subject
of this agreement" and by the terms thereof making the
Stock instrument ineffective as a surrender, if in fact one
was elected to be made, the cornplete lack of any consideration for surrender, the intervening estate in favor
of Ashley \Talley, "\Yhich company, by privity of contract
it was Stock's duty to recognize before dealing with
}feagher, and the fact that Meagher was not the reversioner and entitled to receive surrender as such, all
combined are, or each of said items when considered
separately and regardless of any other factor is, sufficient to sustain the point that, in any event, A-30 is
abortive as a surrender or relinquishment.
8.

A-30 IS NOT EFFECTIVE AS A TRANSFER.

The Stock "release" uses the words "does hereby
cancel, release, relinquish and surrender to N. J. Meagher, his heirs and assigns, all of his right, title and interest in and to the said oil and gas lease, and all of his
right, title and interest in and to the said oil and gas
lease in so far as it conveys the lands above described."
The trial court held that these words were sufficient
to operate as a conveyance or transfer. The circumstances surrounding the use of the particular words are
conclusive to the effect that there was no intention to
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convey anything to Meagher.

The circumstances, as

heretofore pointed out, surrounding the making of the
instrument cannot be disregarded.
In 3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 536, page 19, the
author says:
"In view of all this, it can hardly be insisted
on too often or too vigorously that language at its
best is always a defective and uncertain instrument, that words do not define themselves, that
terms and sentences in a contract, a deed, or a will
do not apply themselves to external objects and
performances, that the meaning of such terms
and sentences consists of the ideas that they induce in the mind of some individual person who
uses or hears or reads them, and that seldom in a
litigated case do the words of a contract convey
one identical meaning to the two contracting parties or to third p·ersons. Therefore, it is invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning to the words of a contract and can select one
1neaning rather than other possible ones as the
basis for the determination of rights and other
legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be heard
to make the court aware of the 'surrounding circumstances,' including the persons, objects, and
events to which the words can be applied and
which caused the words to be used. This is true,
whether the court is trying to discover the meaning that the user of the words gave them, or the
meaning that some hearer or reader gave then1
in the past, or the meaning that 'a norn1al speaker
of English' would have given them, or the meaning that a resonable and prudent and intelligent
man would have given them."
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Meagher now asserts that the meaning of the instrument 'vas to convey to hin1 an interest in the leasehold, but all of the surrounding circu1nstances indicate
that this 'vas not his original position. Originally he
asserted that his only purpose was to clear up the record
title. This is demonstrated by: (a) the letters from
:Jieagher to Stock and others, (b) the recitals in the instrument, (c) the fact that there had been no oil or gas
pr9duction on the premises for some time, and (d) the
disclaimer of any leasehold by Meagher's quitclaim to
his children on January 27, 1948.
Among the letters referred to above is Exhibit A-28,
the letter from Meagher to Phebus under date of November 9, 1944. The date of the letter to Phebus is so
close to the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944 as to
make any expression therein evidence of Meagher's state
of mind not only when he obtained the Stock instrument
but when he had it in his possession and recorded it on
November 3, 1944. To Phebus on November 9, 1944 he
said in part :

"I have been requested for a lease on the 480
acres of land which I own * * * I believe you know
I would not ask for surrender of anybody's rights
without payment, but in this instance actually no
rights exist for anybody through that old lease
of 1924."
The implication of the above cannot be denied or brushed
aside. Meagher was not asking for a transfer of interest
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nor did he believe the Stock instrument, which he had
placed of record six days before, to be a transfer or a
surrender.
The point at issue is the state of Meagher's mind
in obtaining the Stock release of October 21, 1944. The
state of a man's mind is as much a question of fact as
the state of his digestion. The state of Meagher's mind
at this time is unequivocally demonstrated by the words
he used in his letter to Phebus quoted above, and conclusively demonstrates that he had no intention during
any of this time of acquiring either a transfer or a
surrender of any portion of the leasehold estate. His
only purpose at that time was to clear the title of what
he thought to be dead timber.
It is our contention that the thought of a transfer
or a surrender of a portion of the leasehold estate never
occurred to Meagher until on or about April 22, 1949
when he proposed his third amended complaint. Certainly the change in Meagher's state of mind, prompted
by self-interest and after the discovery of oil, could not
change the legal effect of or give added weight to a writing which he acquired almost five years before in October of 1944, at which time, by language, he characterized his own purpose and intent to the contrary of what
he now claims.
3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 539 says:

"The courts do not love an 'objective' theory
of contract or apply it in the process of interpretation merely because it is 'objective.' They apply
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it only "\Yhen they find in faet that one of the parties understood the words of agree1uent in harmony "\Yith such an interpretation and that the
other party had reason to know that he did. Indeed, the court may be convinced that both parties
so understood the 'vords and that subsequently
discovered self -interest has caused one of them to
assert a different meaning.* * *" (Italics ours).
In view of the facts and circumstances and the recitals included in the instrument, the court may construe
the recitals as conditions and hold that the conditions
were not met-rendering the instrument ineffective.
Another thing equally indicative that there was no
intention. to convey anything by the Stock instrument
is the practical construction given by the parties.
In 3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 558, page 141, we
find:

"The process of practical interpretation and
application, however, is not regarded by the parties as a re1naking of the contract; nor do the
courts so regard it. Instead, it is merely a further
expression by the parties of the meaning that they
give and have given to the terms of their contract
previously made. There is no good reason why
the courts should not give great weight to these
further expressions by the parties, in view of the
fact that they still have the same freedom of contract that they had originally. In cases so numerous as to be impossible of full citation here, the
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pretation and construction by the parties is admissible to aid in choosing the meaning to which
legal effect will be given."
To the sarne effect, see Restatement, Contracts, Section 235 (e). In Lawrence National Bank v. Rice, 82 F.
2d 28 (lOth C.C.A. 1936), a case unrelated on its facts,
the court quotes from Brooklyn Life Insurance Company
v. Dutcher, 95 U. S. 269, 273, 24 L.Ed. 410, as follows:
" 'There is no surer way to find out what
parties meant, than to see what they have done.
Self-interest stimulates the mind to activity, and
sharpens its perspicacity. Parties in such cases
often claim more, but rarely less, than they are
entitled to.' " (Italics ours.)
During the first trial Meagher based his claim only
upon the forfeiture provision in the lease. Stock and
his successors in interest defended only on the ground
that there had been no forfeiture. Was there any reason
why Meagher could not have used the Stock instrument
as a separate count at the outset if he thought he had
gained an interest through that instrumentY
Another point by which we assert that the instrument should not be interpreted as a conveyance· is the
doctrine that in interpreting the meaning of a word or
words a meaning should be given which is the fess favorable in its legal effect to the party who chose the words.
(Meagher prepared the rele~se.) 3 Corbin on Contracts,
Section 559; Restatement, Contracts, Section 236( d).
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Another factor is that the type of instrument signed
by Stock is not of a type which is usually used to trans-

fer oil and gas leasehold rights.
24 .L-1nl. J ur., Gas and Oil, Section 87 :

H'Vhile the contents of an assignment or a
sublease necessarily depend upon the desires and
necessities of the parties, it seems that most such
instruments specify the nature and amount of the
consideration to be paid by the transferee, outline
any developmental duties that may have been
imposed upon him, and require him to keep and
perform the covenants of tbl) lease. Thus, a
grant of this kind may accord the grantor an
overriding royalty, consisting of a designated
fraction or percentage of the 'working interest'
or of the 'total production,' or it may require the
grantee to pay a designated sum in cash and another out of the proceeds of production. Not infrequently it calls upon him to drill one or more
wells. Other provisions met with from time to
time include a forfeiture clause, a provision for
liquidated damages, and a warranty of title by
the grantor."
In addition this court is now called upon to determine the effect of the instrument by the sheer weight of
its words.

Was it a release or surrender which failed

because of the absence of an immediate estate in the
surrenderee, or was it a transfer of the subleasehold
interest of Stock, creating a new tenancy, with Meagher
becoming the tenant of Ashley

Valley~
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It is true that the courts are not generally concerned
with the technical wording in instruments and that they
will sometimes give effect to an instrument in some manner other than intended where it is not effective hecause
of a technical defect. What the courts are trying to
ascertain, of course, is the intention of the parties. The
words used are very strong evidence of intention. Our
basic question is whether this instrument shows any
intention on the part of Stock to create a new interest
in Meagher by assigning to him an interest in the oil
mineral estate.
~

The words used are "cancel, release, relinquish and
surrender." What is the natural and ordinary meaning
of these words~
In Clegg v. Schvaneveldt (1932), 79 Utah 195, 8 P.
2d 620, 621, the court in defining the word "canceled"
said:
"The word 'canceled' means to make void or
invalid. It is synonymous with annul, abolish,
revoke, abrogate, repeal, make void, do away
with, set aside, etc."
See also 6 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 33, 12 C.J.S.
936.
In 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd Rev.)
2863, 2864, we find the following concerning the word
"release":
"The giving up or abandoning a claim or
right to the person against whom the claim exists
or the right is to be exercised or enforced.
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Releases n1ay either give up, discharge, or
abandon a right of action, or convey a man's
interest or right to another who has possession of
it or some estate in the same. Shepp. Touchst.
3~0: Littleton 444. In the former class a mere
right i~ surrendered~ in the other not only a right
is given up, but an interest in the estate is conyeyed and beco1nes vested in the release (sic.).

* * *
In general, the words of a release will be
restrained by the particular occasion of giving it;
T. Raym. 399. It cannot apply to circttmstances
of which the party had no knowledge at the time
he executed it; and if it be so general as to include
matters never contemplated, the party will be entitled to relief; 6 H. & N. 347. (Italics ours.)

* * *
In estates. The conveyance of a man's interest or right which he hath unto a thing to
another that hath the possession thereof or some
estate therein. Shepp. Touchst. 320. The relinquishment of some right or benefit to a person
who has already some interest in the tenement,
and such interest as qualifies him for receiving or
availing himself of the right or benefit so relinquished. Burton, R. P. 15*."
See also 36 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 760.
Relinquishment is defined by Bottvier (Id. 2869) as
"a forsaking, abandoning, or giving over of a right."
And in 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd Rev.)
3211, we find that "surrender" means:

"A yielding up of an estate for life or years
to hin1 who has an immediate estate in reversion
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or remainder, by which the lesser estate is merged
in the greater by mutual agreement. Co. Litt.
337b. See Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 Pac.
369, 25 Am. St. Rep. 145."
For additional definitions of "relinquish" and "surrender" see 36 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 797, and
40 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 873.
All of these words give the impression of a "letting
go" of rights already had against the person to whom the
instrument was addressed. None of them, alone or
together, tend to show an intention to transfer interests
of the signer, either by way of quitclaim deed or assignment.
In connection with the above the definitions of cancel, surre~der, release and relinquish, the case of
Benton et al. v. Jones et al.J 220 S.W. 193 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920), should be mentioned. In this case there was
an issue as to the effect of an instrument which purported to "bargain, sell, and release and quitclaim" certain interests of the signer. In construing the instrument, the court said :
"It is manifest this is simply a release. While
it proposes to convey an interest, yet its evident
meaning is to release liens held by the grantor.
Every part of the instrument must be taken to
ascertain the intention of the parties to it. The
form used will not so much control as the relation
of the parties at the time and their intention.
As said by Judge Williams in the case of Sanborn
v. Crowdus, 100 Tex. 605, 102 S.W. 719:
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•An intention to convey land which had not
been before sold and conveyed could not be
gathered fron1 a reading of this release. Such a
meaning 'Yould never be imputed to it by any
one looking alone to its tern1s. * * * Nowhere does
an intention appear to make a new grant of anything. * * * But by its recitals it connects itself
with the former conveyance recited, and the two
are thus made the complements of each other.
* * *The two are to be construed together.' "
(Italics ours.)
The words, taken as they appear in the instrumeut
are not words of conveyance. It is provided by statute
that a quitclaim deed when executed as required by law
shall have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title,
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the premises
described in the deed. Section 78-1-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943. The instrument involved in the present case is
not in the form prescribed by the statute, so we have a
question as to whether it is effective as a quitclaim.
This court held in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western
Min. &MiU. Co., supra, that the words of the statute are
permissive only and that it is not necessary to use the
statutory form in order to convey property by quitclaim
deed.
We can concede that any one of' the words used
in the present instrument might be sufficient to operate
by way of quitclaim if the proper intention appeared.
For instance, if it appeared that Meagher was a stranger
to the title, and that he paid to Stock a valuable consideration for the instrument, we might well find that
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there was an intention to convey property. And there
is no reason why such an intention should not be given
effect by the courts. If the instrument does not operate
under the statute it still might operate by the common
law. What are the requisites for such operation~ What
factors must be present in order to give to an instrument the effect of a conveyance when it fails as a surrender or

release~

This problem has been considered by the courts of
New Jersey, a state in which there has been no statutory
regulation of conveyance by quitclaim deed. In Havens

et al. v. Sea-Shore Land Co. (1890), 20 A. 497 (N. J.
Eq.), the court, in discussing the problem of giving the
effect of a conveyance to a release, said :

"* * * a deed which has failed of effect as a release,
for want of an estate in possession in the releasee,
may, if it is founded on a valuable consideration,
be given effect as a bargain and sale."
The court in Meeks v. Bickford (1924), 125 A. 15
(N. J. Eq.), states:

"* * * equity will interfere and give the effect of
a bargain and sale deed to one of quitclaim where
it appears that the releasor had an interest in the
land and intended to convey such interest to the
releasee. This interest may be a contingent one.
But there must be an interest which the releasor
may lawfully convey and it must also appear that
a valuable consideration was paid therefor."
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See al~o JJ[errill ct al. v.
(N.J. Eq.) .

Pete1~son

(1931), 154 A. 9

. A.s before shown, there \vas an intervening estate
between that of the releasor and the releasee (Ashley
Valley) and, therefore, the instrument must fail as a
release or surrender of the premises unless the surrender is consented to by the owner of the intervening
estate. The cases above cited indicate that this is not
a situation in which an instrument, failing as a surrender, will be given effect as a conveyance. This because there was (1) no intention to convey, as shown
by the recitals and the operative words used; and (2)
there was no consideration for the instrument; and certainly no valuable consideration.
Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that the
instrument is effective, either as a release, surrender, or
quitclaim, there is still a question of construction as to
just what interest was surrendered.

The "release"

signed by Stock refers in the recitals to an oil and gas
lease dated the 4th day of June 1924, and to the pages
of the county records in which the instrument was recorded. There is no reference to the modification agreement of May 21, 1927, nor to its place of record. Because
of the wording in the recitals and the reference in the
operative clause to "said lease", a question is raised
as to just what interest was "surrendered," if any. Even
though a quitclaim deed, or release, contains general
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words of grant these words niay be limited by other
portions of the deed if it appears that there was no
intention to quitclaim all rights in given property.
This is indicated by a number of cases.

Allen v. Hall (1903), 73 P. 844 (Colo.):
In this case the plaintiff had taken a deed from the
defendant of certain real property as security for a loan.
Thereafter the plaintiff executed to defendant a quitclaim deed which recited, in substance, after the general
statement, that the grantor conveyed all her right, title,
and interest in such premises; that it was given to the
grantee for the sole purpose of surrendering to the
grantee the same title plaintiff had acquired from the
defendant in the security transaction. In holding that
the plaintiff did not convey all of her right, title, and
interest in the land, but only the security interest, the
plaintiff having prior to the making of the deed obtained another conveyance of the land, the court said:
"According to the plain language of the deed
which the plaintiff gave to the defendant, the
plaintiff only conveyed that title which she had
obtained through the conveyance of the defendant to her. The intention of parties to a conveyance, as gathered from the whole instrument, will
control, so that a general description of title, followed by a clause stating the intention of the
parties as to the particular title conveyed, controls the prior recitations on the subject. (Citing
case.) Plaintiff only purported to convey the
title which she had received from the defendant;
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consequently, \YhateYer other title 1nay have been
vested in her at the tiine of that transfer was not
affected by the one given defendant."
Plnn1mer

1-·.

Gould, et al. (1892), 52 N.W. 146

(Mich.):
Defendants conveyed to plaintiff all their right, title
and interest in all the lands in certain counties. A subsequent clause in the deed recited:
~' ~The

purpose and intent of this deed being
to convey to the said second parties all and each
of the right, title, claim, and interest, either in
possession or expectancy, of the said first parties,
of, in, and to the above-described premises. by
virtue of certain deeds of conveyance to the said
John F. Driggs, deceased, viz. : * * * (describing
grantors of conveyance referred to).' "
The facts showed that none of the described grants
had been effective to convey any interest to the defendants and that, therefore, the plaintiff would take nothing
if the grant were limited to the interests described. The
court said:
"The intention of the parties, as gathered
from the whole instrument, will control; and in
case of a general description followed by a clause
sun1ming up the intention of the parties as to the
premises conveyed, it has a controlling effect
upon all the prior phrases used in the description
(citing cases)."
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.

In Haynes v. Hunt et al. (1939), 96 Utah 348, 85 P.
2d 861, construing a deed, the court adopts the general
rule that the intention must be found from a reading
of the whole instrument. The issue was the nature of
the estate created, whether a grant or a license. The
court says:
"'When the intention of the parties to a deed
or contract can be ascertained from it, such intention 'vill prevail, unless in contravention of some
rule of law; and, when such intention can be
ascertained, arbitrary rules of law are not to be
invoked, and will not control the construction of
the instrument.' Kirwin v. Farr, 17 Utah 1, at
page 5, 53 P. 608, at page 609; Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 160 P. 121."
In the instrUment executed by Stock reference was
made only to a lease of 1924, and the operative words
of the "release" referred only to that lease. Should this
be construed to release or surrender rights in an instrument of 1927 which is not referred to and not conten1plated by the parties~ This may depend upon whether
the parties regarded the instrument of 1927 a "new
lease" or merely an amendment of the old one.
It is true that the 1927 document was titled "Modification Agreement," but the nature ·of instruments is
generally the guide as to what they are. What they are
called is not controlling.

The modification agreement

of 1927 is a lengthy document providing in great detail
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gated virtually eYery provision which was contained in
the lease of 19:24. This being true, \vhat \Vas its

effect~

In Peterson et zt.r. v. Betts et al. (1946), 165 P.
2d 95 ('\""ash.), the court \vas called upon to determine
whether a

ne"~

agreement between landlord and tenant

was a continuation of the old lease or was in effect a
new lease. Said the court :
"The April lease is for enlarged premise8,
for enlarged term, for a very different rental,
and whereas the January lease provided for certain alterations, the April lease did not, but, on
the other hand, specifically provided that the
lessor should not be responsible for repairs. It
then went on and repeated, word for word, all
the general provisions of the January lease, such
as, guaranteeing the lessee first chance of a further lease, the first option to buy in case of sale,
the right of lessor to reenter in case of lessee's
failure to pay rent, covenant against assignment
or subletting without lessor's written consent, and
lessee's covenant to surrender the premises upon
expiration of the lease in as good repair as they
are now, any ordinary wear and tear and damages by fire excepted. In other words, it was in
every way a complete lease, effective as of April
1st, and lessor (sic) accepted the premises 'in
the condition as is of this date.' That date, it
seems to us, can only be taken to be April 1st.
But what the parties intended in this respect was not a question for the jury, nor is it
open to the court to speculate as to their intent.
The instrument being a complete lease, the law
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says that it superseded the January lease, and,
although there was no physical surrender of the
premises covered by that lease, that there was,
nevertheless, in law, a surrender and a new entry
on Aprillst."
And see Diamanti et al. v. Aubert et al. (1926), 68 Utah
582, 251 P. 373, wherein the court announces the general
rule that the execution of a new lease to one of the
original tenants, and its part performance, amounts to
a surrender of the old lease by operation of law.
The letters from Meagher, the recitals in the Stock
instrument, all indicated that Meagher intended to obtain
no interest by the Stock instrument, and that Stock had
no interest to convey. If the language of the Stock "release" is taken to refer only to the 1924 lease, Meagher
will have received exactly what he wanted-nothing.
There certainly was no donative intent to transfer
from Stock to Meagher one-half of the oil mineral estate,
nor do we think that such will be argued or contended
for by respondent. Meagher himself stated that he
would not expect a transfer of inte·rest without consideration, Exhibit A-28. A consideration is not stated in the
release. There being no consideration, the inadequacy
of the situation is apparent.

Under the circumstances

of this case and as in the rule announced in H allorar1r

Judge Trust Co. et al. v. Carr et ux. (1923), 62 Utah 10,
218 P. 138, the release, as a conveyance or transfer,
should be set aside :
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~'The

remaining question is as to inadequacy of the consideration. The general rule is
that a conYeyance based on an inadequate consideration 'vill not be canceled or set aside for
that reason alone unless the inadequacy is so
great as to shock the conscience and furnish of
itself evidence of fraud. 1 Black on Rescission
and Cancellation, Sections 169 and 175; 9 C. J.
Section 35, p. 1174; Bruner v. Cobb, 37 Okl. 228,
131 Pac. 165,_ L.R.A. 1916D, 377, and annotations."
That there must be a consideration for a deed ib
the implication of the recent statement of this court in
Williams et al. v. Barney et al. (1950), 224 P. 2d. 1042:
"There is however a presumption of consideration, 16 Am. Jur. p. 653, and there appears
in the record not one word refuting the adequacy
of the consideration. The deeds, making plaintiffs' chain of title including this one, were admitted in evidence without objection, and the
question of adequacy of consideration, or that
the instrument was other than a deed was never
raised."

In the instant case a presumption of consideration
is dissipated by the Meagher letters and the recitals of
the so-called release. That a consideration was thought
to be necessary is the statement of the same by counsel
in the pretrial hearing at Vernal, hereinbefore referred
to, and of Finding of Fact numbered 42, also previously
referred to, both of which, the assertion on the one hand
and the finding on the other, have been conclusively
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shown not to be supported in fact or in law. Any am.
biguity in the release itself is resolved against Meagherand answered by the positive testimony of Stock that
he did not intend to transfer any leasehold interest (R.
262-266).
9.

MEAGHER'S ALLEGED OIL ROYALTY INTEREST
CANNOT BE ADJUDICATED IN THIS ACTION.

By amendment to the second amended complaint,
made at the time of trial June 26, 1950 (R. 230), a new
issue wa.s injected into the case, respondent fearing that
he might be subjected to res judicata on the issue of
whether Meagher is entitled to 2% or to 1-1/3% of the
so-called landowners or oil royalty interest (R. 233).
It was stipulated that appellants, without. the necessity
of amendment or further pleading, should be deemed
to have controverted the allegation (R. 232). The issue
is concerned prirnarily with Exhibit A-40, a photostat
of a recorded agreement, whereby, and under date of
October 11, 1930, Meagher divested himself of one-third
of his oil royalty interest with the understanding that if
a test well was not drilled upon the Ashley Valley
structure, as specified in the agreement, Stock and Phebus, to whom the interest was sold, would "reconvey"
the same to Meagher.
The oil royalty interest originally assigned by
Smith, 1% to Meagher, Exhibit A-46, and 1% by Smith
to Alexander and from Alexander to Meagher, Exhibit
A-55, while carved out of the normal landowners royalty,
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is, nevertheless, a covenant running with the land or a
chose in action. ....\.-46, and sin1ilar language in A-55,
requires the holder of the oil lease or the purchasers of
the oil produced from the leased lands to pay the holder
of the royalty interest a percentage based upon the
value of the oil produced and saved, thus creating a
covenant for the pay1nent of money rather than a setting
apart of the oil itself. It is fair to say that the holder
of the oil royalty interest does not have an interest in
the oil in place or the oil produced, except the percentage
in money of the value of the oil calculated as in the
assignment and agreement specified.

Furthermore, the

assignment and agreement acts in the nature of a division order requiring production of the instrument or a
certified copy thereof to enforce recovery from the
holder of the lease or the purchaser of the oil, with the
assignment and agreement expressly being made assignable by the so-called grantee therein.
The 1/3 of 2% oil royalty interest follows the same
chain of title as does the interest in the leasehold as it
affects the oil mineral estate, i.e., Stock and Phebus
transferred to the Standard Oil Company of California,
Exhibit A-12, which company transferred to
fornia Company, Exhibit A-13.

T~e

Cali-

The California Com-

pany transferred back to Stock and Phebus, Exhibit A1-t, the latter instrument being dated March 21, 1934.

So far as the record discloses, Meagher made no attempt
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to obtain a reconveyance at any time prior to the
amendment in June of 1950, assuining the amendrnent
to be deemed such an attempt.
After March 21, 1934, one-half of the one-third of
2% oil royalty interest was transferred by Phebus to
Juhan and the other one-half of the same by Stock,
through mesne conveyances and assignments, to Juhan.
· From Juhan the interest is traced in part back to Stock,
in part to Weber Oil Company through Equity Oil Con1pany and then deemed merged in the working interest
owners, Juhan, Stock and Weber, with Equity Oil Company the operator, by the operating agreement of December 30, 1948, Exhibit A-25.
A cause of action accrued in favor of Meagher not
later than, and probably before, March 21, 1934, when
The California Company transferred back to Stock and
Phebus. Giving Meagher the benefit of the most extreme
point of time, approximately three months short of sixteen years elapsed between the transfer back and Meagher's assertion by the amendment. His action would,
therefore, be barred by subsection 2, Section 104-2-22,

Utah Code Annotated 1943, requiring an action upon a
written contract within six years from the accrual of
the cause of action.
The amendment was made approximately one year
and nine months after the discovery of oil on September
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ditions indirated, l\Ieagher is guilty of laches in asserting an obviously stale de1nand. The defenses of laches
and the statute of lilnitations arise on the face of the
record, and, in accordance with the stipulation above
referred to, were not required to be pleaded.
Exhibit A-40, by "'"hich Meagher divested himself
of one-third of the 27o oil royalty interest, on its face is
promissory as it pertains to a reco-nveyance and cannot
be construed as a conditional divestiture.
In the case of Pfister et al. v. Cow Gulch Oil Co.
et al., supra, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held,
under circumstances in point with the case at bar, where
Pfister assigned a lease to the Cow Gulch Oil Company
with a provision that unless Cow Gulch discovered oil on
or before August 2, 1945 it should surrender the lease
and assign it back to Pfister, there was no automatic
termination of the assignment on the failure to discover
oil within the stipulated period. The court said:
"It is too plain to require further exposition
that under no theory of terminati<;>n could the
rights of Atlantic in the new lease, which was
lawfully acquired by Cow Gulch and which had
lawfully passed to Atlantic by assignment, become vested in Pfister."
There being no evidence of a reconveyance, the obligation to pay the royalty interest to the record owner is
still outstanding. Finding of Fact numbered 59 is inconsistent with Conclusion of Law numbered 3 of B, which
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in turn is unsupported in fact or in law and likewise unsupported is that portion of the decree to the effect that
Meagher is the owner of an oil royalty interest of 2%.
The record title is uncontroverted to the effect that
~{eagher cannot claim, under any circurnsta.nce, rnore
than two-thirds of 2% of the oil royalty interest. He
effectively transferred, assigned and divested himself of
one-third of his former 2% oil royalty interest by A-40.
As the record stands, Equity Oil Company is in
possession of the property and is extracting and selling
the oil. It is not a party to this suit nor is Weber Oil
Company. The trial court, in its memorandum decision,
stated that its holding in favor of Meagher could not
become res judicata as to Equity Oil Company nor Weber
Oil Company, the holding being somewhat diluted by
Conclusion of Law numbered 13, wherein it is concluded
that the conclusions are not res judicata with respect to
Weber Oil Company. In any event, Meagher's action,
as it concerns the agreement to reconvey the oil royalty
interest of which he divested himself on October 11, 1930,
is one in personam and not in rem. Meagher is fully
aware, by the record, of the fact that the oil is being
produced and sold by a party or parties not before the
court. The contract, Exhibit A-40, speaks for itself and,
whe~ther

Meagher's action be one to enforce a covenant

running with the land or one. for breach of contract, it
cannot be enforced in a suit to quiet title and in the
absence of the necessary parties.
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.At this point it is interesting to observe that the

findings, conclusions and decree do not proceed on the
theory that at least one-half of the one-third of 2% oil
royalty interest passed by the release, A-30, through
'vhich

~leagher

claims a transfer or an assigniuent of a

leasehold interest, like,vise a chose in action.

The trial

court's fifty-five page me1norandun1 decision, cutting the
lease in half on the theory of surrender, would seem to
arrive at that point, but not so when the theory was
reversed by the findings, conclusions and decree submitted by counsel, and later adopted by the court, with the
simple expression that it makes no difference whether
the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944 be denominated a surrender or a transfer.
CONCLlTSION
It is not our purpose nor intent to burden this
brief with a restatement of the several points which,
we believe, in the mere statement of the same most
thoroughly and cogently den1onstrate the fallacy of the
decree appealed from. At this point, however, we feel
that it is appropriate and pertinent to point out a ve-ry
striking and incongruous fact.
The trial was in a court of equity. And yet, by the
decree appealed from, the greatest inequity has been
done. Respondent, Meagher, has been awarded far more
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than he could have ever obtained even upon the assumption that he owned the fee title together with all mineral
rights in the property.
Meagher is a banker. He is not an oil man and,
so far as the record shows, has never had any oil business experience. Upon the assun1ption that Meagher
was the unquestioned owner of the fee title, together
with all mineral interests thereunto appertaining, not
even burdened by the previous landowners royalty or
the covenants created by Smith, and that he might deal
with the property as he saw fit, the very best thing he
could have hoped to accomplish would have been to
induce some qualified oil company to undertake a prodigious gamble in a territory never before explored and
lying at a remote distance from any actual oil production. If Meagher had been able to induce some qualified oil company to undertake this grossly speculative
venture, the very best that Meagher could have received,
as land and mineral owner, would have been the usual
and prevailing one-eighth landowners royalty interest
in accordance with the custom, usage and practice of
the oil business.
Thus, had Meagher been the unquestioned fee and
mineral interest owner, he could have obtained no better
than a one-eighth royalty interest.
Yet by a decree in a court of equity Meagher was
awarded an undivided one-half interest in a now fully
developed and producing, multi-million dollar oil field
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toward which he contributed not one cent; for which he
risked absolutely nothing; and during the development
of \Yhich he sat silently by speculating upon the outcorne.
Is it to be believed that if the result had produced
a

~·dry

hole" that Mr. Meagher would have rushed in

and offered his 50% contribution of the costs in a

failure~

We think not.
The very result obtained by Meagher, under all the
circumstances, is on its face so grossly inequitable as
to be unconscionable. This result in itself gives immediate pause to a careful and critical consideration and
inspection of the facts and circumstances by which such
an anomalous conclusion could have been reached. The
result is so inequitable and unfair that it immediately
condemns and contaminates the foundations and the
structure upon which it rests. Meagher paid nothing
for the instrument nor did he forego anything. His position was not changed by reason of it and to cancel the
document would not take away anything that he had
before its deiivery. On the other hand, to give vitality
to the instrument one would have to ignore the purposes
for which it was given; the total lack of consideration;
Meagher's lack of diligence; the contrary construction
that he placed upon it by his own words and conduct;
the language of the instrument; and would permit him
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to perpetrate a fraud. There is nothing in Meagher's
conduct that commends itself to the court even if he had
a legal position, which he has not. The equities are,
without exception, in favor of :these appellants.
It is not necef?sary to remind this court that this
is perhaps the first case of consequence in this state and
in this court dealing with the problems pointed out as
affecting oil and gas leases. Of the several problems
affecting these appellants is the matter of maintaining
a continuity of ,leasehold interest when, after the leasehold has been broken up into fractions, an extension,
rene,val or rewriting in favor of one fractional interest
holder inures to the benefit of the entire leasehold.
While we cannot claim, as stated at the outset, any
interest by conveyance or assignment in the North Forty,
nevertheless, it is a part of a leasehold purposely recognized as such by respondent when he, with the other
royalty holders, joined in and approved of the modification agreement of May 21, 1927, committing himself
to the lands, the subject of said agreement, as being
the entire 480 acres.
So far as these appellants are concerned the working or leasehold interests in 440 acres of the tract are
held 50% by Weber, 25% by Stock and 25% by Juhan
as reflected by the operating agreement of December
30, 1948. So far as Ashley Valley Oil Company is conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

I

I

I

143

cerned, and as against nleagher and those claiming
under hin1, the working interests or operating rights in
the ren1aining acreage, or the North Forty, is held by it.
We submit that for all the reasons hereinbefore
stated the decision of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HARLEY W. GUSTIN
EDWARD F. RICHARDS
CARVEL MATTSSON
Attorneys for Appellants Ray
Phebus, Paul Stock and Joe T.
Juhan
OLIVER W. STEADMAN
Of counsel for Paul Stock
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APPENDIX "A"

Outline analysis of Smith-Ashley Valley modification
agreement, A.-5, giving lessee the limited privilege of
surrender.
RECITALS:

(1) Sheridan t.o Hi'll lease, June 4, 1924, Exhibit
A-1, to 480 acres.
(2) Grant by Hill to Utah Oil Re·fining Company,
October 30, 1924, Exhibit A-2, of exclusive right of possession and occupancy during the life of lease of June 4,
1924 of all but the North Forty.
~

(3) "Assignment", Hill to Ashley Valley Oil Company, November 10, 1924, Exhibit A-3, of all Hill's rights
in the above Hilt-Utah Oil Refining Company agreement.
(4) Ashley Valley Oil Comp-any. represents ~that as
of the date of A-5 it is the owner of the rights, p-roperty
and interests acquired under A-3, the "assignment" Hill
to Ashley Valley Oil Company, insofar as the same pertains to the 440 acres.
(5) Warranty Deed, November 14, 1924, Exhibit
A-4, Sheridan et al. rto·M. P. Smith of fee title, including
mineral estate, subject to R. C. Hill lease of June 4,
1924.
(6) Grants of royalty interests by Smith, (a) to
Sheridans 3%, (b) to Dick 0 of 1%, (c) to N. J. Meagher
1%, to W. N. Preas 1%, to T. G. Alexander 1%, to
1
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Columbia Trust Company 4%, and to W. H. Lovesy 2%;
in all totaling 120o/o and having ·to do with the entire
480 acres.
(7) The desire of the parties (Smith-Ashley Valley Oil Company) "insofar as they have the legal right
and power so to do, to change and modify the terms"
of June 4, 1924, R. C. Hill lease.
OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:

I. Defines "the lands the subject of this agreement" as meaning and applying to the entire 480 acres.
II. Defines rthe term "R. C.. Hill Lease" to mean
the lease of June 4, 1924.
III. That insofar as the lands "the subject of this
agreement" are concerned paragraphs numbered 2 to
22, both inclusive, of the R. C. Hill Lease at all times
from and after the date of Exhibit A-5, "do and shall
have no further application, force and/or effect, but,
for all purposes are hereby fully discharged, superseded
and replaced by the following paragraphs numbered 2 to
______ ,both inclusive, to-wit: * * *". (The Hill lease, Exhibit
A-1, contains 22 numbered paragraphs with all before
paragraph numbered 2 being the formal statement of
the date, the parties, the consideration, the grant and
the description of rthe land, including the 480 acres .
. Land outside of the p-roperty herein invoived is also
included in the original Hill lease.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
AMENDING PARAGRAPHS:

2. The lease to re1nain in effect so long as the lessee
complies with the "obligations" of A-5.
3. Promise of lessee to endeavor to secure profitable market for gas encountered in the test well on Section 23 and for other gas that may be found, subject to
the right of surrender and agreeing to market and produce gas regardless of whether oil is encountered.
4. On or before September 1, 1927 to commence
or cause to be commenced the drilling of an oil well to be
continuously drilled, with certain exceptions, until the
Sundance formation has been drilled through, unless
there shall have been encountered within the Sundance
formation oil in commercial quantity, as in said paragraph defined. The drilling to be "upon the geologic
structure upon which the lands the subject of this agreement are located,* * *".
4a. Lessee may use either oii or gas developed on
the property for development or production operations
and shall not be chargeable for unavoidable loss or held
responsible for unavoidable delays.
5. If well is drilled upon lands other than the lands
"the subject of this agreement", resulting in commercial
discovery of oil, lessee, subject rto the right of surrender,
shall commence or cause to be commenced, the drilling
of an oil well at some point to be selected by the lessee
"upon the lands the subject of this agreement", or to
deepen a test well previously commenced, if any, subject
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to the right of surrender, all in order to adequately and
thoroughly test for oil, the horizon in which oil 1night
have been discovered by the lessee outside of the lands
subject to the agreement, with exceptions excusing drilling when igneous rock or other geologic formations or
conditions might prevent.
6. Provisions for further drilling if oil in commercial quantities, as in said paragraph defined, is encountered in any geological horizon deeper than the Sundance
in any well by whomsoever drilled in the Vernal, Utah
District, or in Northwestern Colorado, and if such deeper
horizon 'lies within a depth of 3500 feet beneath the surface of any portion of the lands located upon the geological structure upon which the lands the subject of this
agreement are located, subject to the right of surrender.
I

7. Provision for arbitration if parties cannot agree
as to whether igneous or other geological formations or
conditions have been encountered preventing further
drilling or whether a deeper horizon than the Sundance
lies within a depth of 3500 feet beneath the surface.
8. Lessee to offset any commercially producing well
upon other lands located within 300 feet of :the exterior
boundaries of the lands "the subject of this agreement".
9. Provisions with respect to testing upon encountering oil in any appreciable quantity and subject to the
right of surrender to develop the lands consistently
with the current prevailing condition of the market for
the products thereof.
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10. Provisions. for the diameter and other specifications of wells and for adequate drilling rigs and equipment.
11. Provisions for the payment of 120% of the
value of all oil and/or gas produced, with certain exce·ptions.
12. Provisions for the payment of a royalty of
120% of the net proceeds realized from the sale or
other disposal of gasoline manufactured from casmghead gas produced, with certain qualifications.
13. Royalties provided by paragraphs 11 and 12
shall be paid in cash on the 20th day of each calendar
month upon production or net proceeds, as the case may
be, for the preceding calendar month, it being agreed
that the royalties in paragraphs 11 and 12 "are the
same identical royalties upon production from the lands
the subject of this agreement which are by the te-rms
of said Oil and Gas Lease of June 4th, 1924, provided
to be paid by the Lessee to the Lessors" and not in
addition thereto.
The lessee shall pay all taxes, including severance or production taxes, except upon production belong14.

ing to the lessors; provided, that, if the lessee shali exercise his right to surrender, his obligation to pay taxes
shall be reduced rto correspond with retained rights, if
any.
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15. Lesse·e to kee·p records of production and sales.
16.

Lessee- to keep record and log of wells.

17.

Lessors have right to inspect records.

18. Indemnification of lessors for damages, mechanics' liens, debts etc., and lessee to comply with laws
regulating insurance of employees.
19. Lessors to defend title; lessee to have the right
to redeem mortgages or other liens against the property
and be subrogated to the rights of the holders.
20. With subparagraphs (a) and (b), this numbered paragraph contains specific rights of surrender
to be exercised by the lessee. Under subparagraph (a)
he can surrender to Smith or to Smith's nominees all
of the lessee's rights and privileges under the lease and
be relieved and released of all obligations thereafter
accruing. Under subparagraph (b) he can surrender to
M. P. Smith or to said Smith's nominees all the lessee's
rights and privileges under the lease in and to any and
all oil which may be contained in the lands "the subject
of this agreement" and retain the right to prospect for
and produce gas and all portions of the lease consistent
with the retained rights. A proviso is contained in each
of subparagraphs (a) and (b) substantially the same
as the hereinafter quoted portion of paragraph 28, with
the necessary changes being made applicable under (a)
when the surrender is to the entire lease and under (b)
when the surrender is limit.ed to the oil mineral estate.
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21. Right of ~I. P. Smith to purchase casing at
fair cash market Yalue in the event of surrender by the
lessee under subparagraph (a) of 20; right of M. P.
Smith to purchase rigs and related equipment, and provision for arbitration in the event of surrender by the
lessee under subparagraph (b) of 20.
22. After completion of drilling requirements in
paragraph 4, and provided he is not then in default,
subject to the rights of Smith to purchase as in paragraph 21 provided, lessee shall have the right to remove
tools, machinery etc., with provisions for Smith in case
of default by the lessee in the drilling obligations of
paragraph 4, at his election, to have limited right, rent
free for six months, to use rigs, tools etc.
23. Smith has the right to exhibit to the lessee bona
fide written offer or proposition to drill a well to any
horizon deeper than completed drilling under paragraph
4 in the event oil in commercial quantity is not found;
lessee has ninety days from notice to commence or continue upon the lands the subject of this agreement the
actual drilling of an oil well to the depth sp·ecified in
such offer; upon lessee's failure so to do all of the rights
of the lessee in and to "oil" shall automatically cease
and terminate.
24.

If within thirty days after receipt by the

lessee from Smith of written notice of default, specifying
in detail the default complained of and the lessee shall
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fail to correct or repair such default, then at Smith's
e'lection, if the default is in the lessee's drilling obligations under paragraph 4, all rights of the lessee in both
oil and gas shall automatically cease and terminate.
25.

Provisions for easements and rights of way.

26.

Provisions for reciprocal rights of possession

and control in the event of the forfeiture, cancellation,
surrender, or other termination for any cause, of the
lessee's rights to drill for or produce oil so far as rights
of way upon, under and through the lands are concerned;
provision for reciprocal rights of possession and control
relating to rights of way etc., if the gas rights are retained by the lessee.
27.

If the lessors drill a well for oil but find gas

1n commercial quantities, the lessee having retained
the gas rights, then the gas shall belong to the lessee,
provided the lessee, within the time specified, shall reimburse the lessors in cash for one·-half of the fair value
of the casing in the we'll and for one-half of the actual
cost of drilling, the latter to be paid for by delivering
to the lessors the total value at the well of all comJnercial production of gas therefrom until one-half of
the actual cost of drilling said well has in this manner
be~en

paid; the 'lesse·e has the same or reciprocal rights

if drilling for gas and encountering oil when he does
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not have the oil rights; provisions for a completed well
drilled upon the lands by either party while the other
party has oil or gas rights only

a~d

there is encountered

both oil and gas in commercial quantities; protection
of well by party drilling from entry of water and other
damage.
28. Right of 'lessee to surrender gas rights after
oil rights have been surrendered under paragraph 20,
providing lessee is not in default under paragraph 4;
the surrender to be made to M. P. Smith or to said
Smith's nominees of all the lessee's rights and privileges
in and to all gas which may be contained in the lands
the subject of this agreement, with the further provision:

"* * * that said such surrender shall not
become effective until the Lessee shall have delivered to said M. P. Smith or his order properly
executed all necessary instruments of transfer
and do all necessary things in order to fully vest
said Smith and/or his nominees with all the rights
and privileges so surrendered and with such rights
of exclusive possession and control of all of the
lands the subject of this agreement as may be
necessary for the full enjoyment and exercise
by said Smith or his nominees of said such rights
and privileges so surrendered."
29.

Stipulation that lease shall be binding upon

and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, legal
representatives or assigns of the parties thereto.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
FURTHER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:/

IV.

It is agreed that in all particulars said Oil and

Gas Lease of June 4th, 1924, insofar as same relates
or pertains to the lands the subject of this agreemen4
shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with
the terms thereof, except as herein in this Modification
Agreement same is modified and/or changed.
V.

That the parties hereto shall co-operate in an

effort to procure the written approval of this agreement
by all. owners of royalty interests in the lands the subject of this agreement.
VI.

Agreement binding upon the heirs, legal rep-

resentatives or assigns of the parties.
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APPENDIX "B''

Chronology of

~ngnif'icant

Events
Exhibit number or
Record page

Date
June4, 1924
October 30, 1924

Sheridan et al.-R. C. Hill
O&G Lease

"A 1"

R. C. Hill, Trustee, AssignInent to Utah Oil Refining
Company

"A 2"

November 10,1924

R. C. Hill Assignment to
Ashley Valley Oil Company "A 3"

November 14,1924

Warranty Deed from Sheridan et al. to M. P. Smith

"A 4"

February 3, 1925

Assignment from M. P.
Smith and Ellen M. Smith,
his wife, in favor of N. J.
Meagher 1% Royalty Interest
"A 46~'

April 20, 1925

Warranty Deed- 1/5 interest, T. G. Alexander and
wife to N. J. Meagher

"A 9"

Modification Agreement between M.P. Smith and wife
and Ashley Valley Oil
Company

"A 5"

May 21, 1927

June 9, 1927

Modification Agreement Affecting So-Called Sheridan
Lands between Ashley Valley Oil Company and Utah
Oil Refining Company
"A 6"
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November 19,1927

Assignment of 1% Royalty Interest, T. G. Alexander and wife in favor of
N. J. Meagher
"A 55"

December 19, 1927

Quitclaim Deed--4/5 interest-with reservations and
exceptions, M. P. Smith
and wife to N. J. Meagher
Quitclaim Deed -1/5 interest - with reservations
and exceptions, · M. P.
Smith and wife to T. G.
Alexander

December 19, 1927

Ap·ril 24, 1929

May 13, 1929
May 29, 1929

October 11, 1930

Octobe-r 30, 1930

"A 7"

"A 8"

Assignment Agreement of
Utah Oil Refining Company to Ray Phebus and
Paul Stock
"A 11"
Exhibit A-ll recorded,
Uintah Co.
Ray Phebus and Paul
Stock Assignment to Valley Fuel Supply Company
(gas rights)
"A 15"
Assignment of Royalty Interests, N. J. Meagher et
al. to Paul Stock and Ray
Phebus (reduction of outstanding royalties by onethird)
"A 40"
Assignment of Edward
Watson, Trustee ( successor to R. C. Hill), to Ashley Valley Oil Company
(NE·lJ± SE:lJ± Section 15,
the North Forty)
"A 16"
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April30, 1931

Contract (Assignn1ent) between Ray Phebus, Paul
Stock and Standard Oil
Company of California
"A 12"

May 28, 1931

Quitclaiin Deed-1/5 interest-T. G. Alexander and
wife toN. J. Meagher
"A 10"

December 31, 1931

Standard Oil Company of
California Assignment to
The California Qompany
"A 13"

October 31, 1932

Assignment of Right to
Purchase Gas signed by
Ray Phebus and Paul
Stock in favor of Valley
Fuel Supply Company
"A 41"

March 21, 1934

Agreement (Assignment)
between Paul Stock, Ray
Phebus and The California
Company
"A 14"

November 7, 1941

Valley Fuel Supply Company Assignment to Joe T.
Juhan (gas rights)
"A 17"

January 7, 1944

Letter to Paul Stock signed by N. J. Meagher
"A 26"

January 7,1944

Letter to Ray Phebus
from N. J. Meagher
"A 31"

January 17, 1944

Letter to N. J. Meagher
signed by L. G. Hinkley
"A 32"
on behalf of Stock

January 25, 1944

Letter rto N. J. Meagher
signed by Ray Phebus
"A 33"
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March 21, 1944

Letter to Joe T. Juhan
signed by N. J. Meagher
"A 34"

October 11, 1944

Affidavit of Attorney for
Publication of Summons

R. 10

October 16, 1944

Letter to Paul Stock signed by Katherine C. Meagher "A 27"

October 16, 1944

Letter to Ray Phebus signed by Katherine C. Meagher "A 35"

October 16,1944

Letter to Jos. T. Juhan
signed by Katherine C.
Meagher
"A 56"

October 17, 1944

Complaint filed

October 17, 1944

Order for Publication of
Summons

R.l
R. 11

October 21, 1944

Release-Paul Stock to N.
J. Meagher
"A 30"

October 31, 1944

Letter to Katherine C.
Meagher signed by Ray
Phebus
"A 36"

·November 9, 1944

Letter to Ray Phebus signed by N.J. Meagher
"A 28"

.November 13,1944

Letter to N. J. Meagher
signed by Ray Phebus
"A 37"

November 18, 1944

Letter to Ray Phebus signed by N. J. Meagher
"A 38"

January 4, 1945

First Publication of Summons

January 8, 1945

R.13

Declaration of Trust signed by Joe T. Juhan m
favor of Ray Phebus
"A 47"
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(~uitelainl

January 19, 1945

Deed and Assignnlent, Ray Phebus and
wife to Joe T. Juhan
"A18"

February 1, 1945

Last Publication of Sumnlons

R.13

February 19, 1945

.A.nH?nded Complaint filed

R. 14

April14, 1945

Quitclaim Deed and Assignment, Paul Stock to
"A 19"
Charles S. Hill

April14, 1945

Declaration of Trust signed by Charles S. Hill in
favor of Paul Stock
"A 48"

April18, 1945

Second Amended Complaint filed (Stock omitted
in caption)

R. 17r

May 4, 1945

Lis Pendens

May7, 1945

Filed Answer of Juhan to
Plaintiff's S·econd Amended Complaint

R. 20

Filed Answer of the Defendant Ashley Valley Oil
Company

R. 37

May 22, 1945

"A 42"

June 18,'1945

Letter to Paul Stock signed by N.J. Meagher
"A 39"

September 1,1945

Reply of N. J. Meagher
verified (denying leasehold)

January 5, 1946

R. 41

Quitclaim Deed and Assignment, Charles S. Hill
and wife to Joe T. Juhan "A 20"
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January 5, 1946

Declaration of Trust signed by Joe T. Juhan in
favor of Charles S. Hill
"A 49"

January 8, 1946

Phebus adopts Answer of
Juhan

R.43

January 11, 1946

Quitclaim Deed and Assignment, Juhan and wife
to Equity Oil Company
"A 21"

October 27, 1947

Decision of Supreme Court

December 30, 1947

Quitclaim Deed and Assignment, Equity Oil Company to Weber Oil Company
"A 24"

January 27, 1948

Quitclaim Deed, N.J. Meagher to his children
"A 22"

March 15, 1948

Petition for Rehearing denied

R. 56

March 16, 1948

Remittitur issued

R. 56

June 29,1948

Release signed by Ray
Phebus and Ella G. Phebus
in favor of Joe T. Juhan
confirming quitclaim previously executed by Phebus and wife· in favor of
Juhan
"A 50"

July 9, 1948

Letter Agreement written
by Joe T. Juhan, approved
by Paul Stock
"A 51"

R. 57
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July 9,1948

Letter Agreement signed
by J. L. Dougan as President of Equity Oil Company and approved by
Paul Stock and Joe T.
Juhan
"A 52"

July 10, 1948

Paul Stock-Charles S. Hill,
Release confirming quitclaim previously executed
by Hill and wife in favor
of Joe T. Juhan
"A 53"

J nly 12, 1948

Quitclaim Deed, Joe T.
Juhan and wife to Paul
Stock
"A 23"

July 13, 1948

Charles S. Hill and wifeJoe T. Juhan, Release confirming previous quitclaim
deed by Hill and wife in
favor of Juhan
"A 54"

August 1, 1948

Equity Oil commenced drilling operations
"A 25"

September 11, 1948

Deed, Ellen M. Smith et al.
"A 60"
to Clyde S. Johnson

September 14, 1948

Deed, Clyde S. Johnson
and wife to Edward F.
Richards
"A 61"

September 18, 1948

Discovery of oil in commercial quantities

December 30, 1948

R. 255

Operating Agreement between Equity Oil Company, Weber Oil Company,
Joe T. Juhan and Paul
Stock
"A 25"
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April 22., 1949
May 9,1949
June 10, 1949

June 10, 1949

June 10, 1949
August 3, 1949

August 3, 1949

August 17, 1949
Octobe·r 15, 1949

Third Amended Complaint
proposed

R. 67

Filed Objections to filing
Third Amended Complaint

R. 78

Filed Withdrawal of Mo~
tion to file Third Amended
Complaint

R. 80

Filed Motion for Order authorizing filing of Amended Reply to defendants'
Answers

R. 81

Filed proposed Amended
Reply

R.87

Filed Objections to plaintiff's Motion to file Amended Reply (asserting leasehold)

R. 83

Order authorizing filing of
Amended Reply (Stock reappears in caption)

R. 85

Filed Answer and Counterclaim of Paul Stock

R. 92

Served Reply to Answer
and Counterclaim of Paul
Stock

R.107

Amendment to Answer and
Reply to the Counterclaim
of Paul Stock

R. 115

November 12, 1949 · Pretrial proceedings
Vernal, Utah

at
"A 58"
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November 26, 1949

February 25, 1950
June 26, 1950
June 26,1950

March 6, 1951

April14, 1951
June 4, 1951
June 8,1951
June 8,1951
July 7, 1951
July 17, 1951

July 17, 1951

Filed Second Amended Reply to the Answer of
Juhan and Phebus
R. 121
Pretrial proceedings at
Provo, Utah
"A 59"
Second trial held at Provo,
Utah
R.135
Second Amended Complaint
amended to include oil royalty issued involving 1/3 of
2%
R. 230
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision
R.140-194
Filed Objections to Proposed Findings
R. 196
Trial Court's Supplement~
al Memorandum
R.l97-198
Filed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law R. 200-219
Filed Judgment and Decree
R. 220-2.24
Filed Notice of Appeal R. 342-343
Filed Appellants' Designation of Record on ApR. 347-350
peal
Filed Stipulation on Designation of Record
R. 344-346
Chart of Chain of Title,
excluding landowners roy"A 57"
alties
Chart, Chain of Title with
reference to Exhibit numbers
"A 62"
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